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Academic freedom is the ability to explore, research, and analyze any topic 
without prohibitions or repercussions. In the Anglo-American tradition, it is both a 
fundamental aspect of academia and, as this thesis argues, a fundamental human right. 
Although the United States embraces this core principle of academia within American 
universities, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) seeks to suppress the acquisition of 
knowledge through restrictions on topics deemed politically-sensitive to the Chinese 
government.  
Although human rights abuses pervade the PRC and academic freedom is 
suppressed, PRC-funded entities known as Confucius Institutes (CIs) are widely 
embraced at universities in liberal democracies. While CIs are entrusted with cultivating 
within non-Chinese youth an interest in Chinese culture and simplified Mandarin 
Chinese, they inherently jeopardize the mission of institutions of higher learning and 
violate standards of academic freedom.  
Many questions persist about Confucius Institutes and the Chinese government’s 
intent on their expansion. Are human rights abuses in the PRC prominent enough to 
negatively affect its cultural mission abroad? What exactly are Confucius Institutes and 
why are they located at universities that value academic freedom? These questions 
require an examination and deciphering of the overall strategy and intentions of the PRC 
to assert global influence through overseas educational programming. Finally, Western 
Kentucky University is used as a case study to demonstrate the negative impact of having 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
Academic freedom is the ability to explore, research, and analyze any topic 
without prohibitions or repercussions. In the Anglo-American tradition, it is both a 
fundamental aspect of academia and, as this thesis argues, a fundamental human right. 
This conception of academic freedom, however, is absent in the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC). Yet, the PRC has successfully undermined academic freedom within states 
where it is valued through its international cultural outreach strategy with entities known 
as “Confucius Institutes.” Historically, the Chinese philosopher Confucius is emblematic 
of traditional Chinese culture and revered for his commentary on ethical behavior as it 
relates to social, governmental, and moral contexts. At the heart of his teachings is the 
infusion of personal happiness with the obligation of the individual to cultivating a better 
society, the foundation of a liberal arts education in China. Now, the philosopher’s name 
has been appropriated and affiliated with the suppression of academic freedom by the 
Chinese state.  
Are human rights abuses in the PRC prominent enough to negatively affect its 
cultural mission abroad? Is academic freedom truly a universal human right? What 
exactly are Confucius Institutes and why are they primarily located at institutions of 
higher learning? To answer these questions, this thesis examines and deciphers the 
overall strategy and intentions of the Chinese government to assert global influence 
through overseas educational programming. This thesis analyzes prominent human rights 
abuses in the PRC, explores the origins of academic freedom and contends it is a human 
right, and demonstrates how Confucius Institutes violate academic freedom using 
Western Kentucky University as a case study. This thesis harbors no animosity towards 
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the Chinese people, is not rooted in xenophobia, and is not based on anti-communist 
sentiments.1 Instead, this thesis utilizes a human rights framework to argue that 
Confucius Institutes inherently jeopardize academic institutions and violate standards of 
academic freedom. To defend academic freedom, universities must either eliminate their 
Confucius Institute partnership or institute commonsense regulations that protects 
university autonomy over all academic matters.   
                                                 




CHAPTER TWO: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA 
 
The atrocities committed during the Second World War prompted the newly-
created United Nations to issue a call to action to improve the condition of human rights 
around the world. In 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, proclaiming in Article I, “All human beings are born free 
and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should 
act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.”2 Immediately following, Article II 
commands, “Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”3 This 
document was a milestone in the history of human rights, committing the world to a 
higher standard of human rights as a universal concept, not one that was limited to a few. 
One year later, on October 1, 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) established the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC). Over half a century later, the PRC has almost never 
been in compliance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
 The PRC, the world’s most populous state, is notorious for imposing draconian 
restrictions on the freedoms of speech, religion, and assembly while concurrently being 
the world’s leader in environmental pollution. Also a rising superpower and world’s 
second-largest economy, the PRC operates at the behest of the CCP, classifying China as 
                                                 





a state administered by one-party, authoritarian rule.4 While domestic human rights issues 
may not seem relevant to an overseas language education program, it is necessary to 
understand the scope of these issues in China because of their inseparable connection to 
the academic freedom implications outlined later in this thesis. 
 The status of human rights in the PRC is less than stellar, earning considerable 
criticisms from Human Rights Watch (HRW), a nongovernmental organization that 
advocates for human rights around the world. In their 2016 review of China, it is evident 
that human rights are not a priority in President Xi Jinping’s agenda. “Ruled by the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for more than six decades, China remains an 
authoritarian state, one that systematically curtails a wide range of fundamental human 
rights, including freedom of expression, association, assembly, and religion.”5 
Acknowledging a few areas of progress in 2015, such as instituting policies to require 
universities to offer students with disabilities “reasonable accommodation” in university 
entrance exams and reducing the number of death penalty-eligible crimes from fifty-five 
to forty-six, human rights in China still exist in a markedly dismal state.6 Moreover, 
“Senior Chinese leaders, perceiving a threat to their power, now explicitly reject the 
universality of human rights, characterizing these ideas as ‘foreign infiltration,’ and 
penalizing those who promote them. Freedoms of expression and religion, already 
                                                 






limited, were hit particularly hard in 2015 by several restrictive new measures.”7 Areas of 
intense contention among PRC leaders and human rights advocates are recognition of 
Tibetan independence and Chinese perpetration of cultural genocide within the 
semiautonomous region, the freedom of religious expression of members of the Falun 
Gong spiritual clan, draconian restrictions on internet access and Chinese media, and lack 
of academic freedom at Chinese universities. 
 Beginning with the movement for Tibetan independence, the PRC has persistently 
declared that Tibet is a territory under China, has never been an independent state, and its 
leader — the Dalai Lama — has no political authority. The People’s Daily, an official 
newspaper of the CCP and China’s largest newspaper group, wrote in 2008, “For more 
than 700 years, the central government of China has continuously exercised sovereignty 
over Tibet, and Tibet has never been an independent state. No government of any country 
in the world has ever recognised Tibet as an independent state.”8 However, human rights 
advocates with the Free Tibet movement, the official self-determination movement of 
Tibetans to repudiate Chinese occupancy of the region, reaffirm the proclamation of 
independence of the 13th Dalai Lama, Tibet’s premier political and spiritual leader: “We 
are a small, religious, and independent nation.”9  
 Furthermore, the group asserts, “The country had its own national flag, currency, 
stamps, passports and army; signed international treaties, and maintained diplomatic 
                                                 
7 Ibid. 
8 “The Tibet issue,” BBC News, last modified May 21, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/7410745.stm. 




relations with neighbouring countries.”10 While self-determination movements 
themselves have been the subject of human rights debates, the existence of Tibet within 
China (much like Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Taiwan) is widely regarded as one of the 
PRC’s leading human rights abuses. In addition, due to Chinese occupancy of Tibet and 
the perpetration of human rights abuses in the region, in 1994, pro-Tibetan independence 
students in New York City created Students for a Free Tibet (SFT), a nonviolent, social 
justice organization that “works in solidarity with the Tibetan people in their struggle for 
freedom and independence.”11 The movement seeks to campaign for Tibetans’ political 
freedom through “education, grassroots organizing, and non-violent direct action,” 
repudiating the occupation of the Chinese state and appealing to the international 
community for rightful recognition.12 
 Another realm in which the PRC fails at upholding human rights is religious 
freedom, consisting of oppression of Tibetan Buddhists, Uyghur Muslims, and Chinese 
Christians. The general persecution of the Falun Gong religious sect is particularly 
problematic, including strategic propaganda, forced ideological conversion, and organ 
harvesting. Numbering tens of millions of followers, autonomous from the Chinese state, 
and characterized by meditation and slow-moving exercises infused with the moral 
philosophies of truthfulness, compassion, and forbearance, the Falun Gong is “an 
                                                 
10 Ibid. 
11 “Who We Are,” Students for a Free Tibet, accessed November 27, 2016, 
https://www.studentsforafreetibet.org/who-we-are/. 
12 “Protect Academic Freedom: Say No To Confucius Institutes,” Student for a Free Tibet, accessed 




advanced self-cultivation practice of the Buddha School” that was first taught publicly in 
Northeast China in 1992.13 Founded by Li Hongzhi, Falun Gong practice cultivates the 
body and mind to attain enlightenment, operating outside state regulations of proper 
moral conduct and CCP approval. 
 Because of the religious sect’s capacity to mobilize adherents to participate in 
peaceful protests that could potentially result in negative international press, incite 
sympathy from Chinese citizens, or serve as the catalyst for legislative action that 
expands religious freedom, the CCP views the Falun Gong as a threat to the CCP’s 
authority. Consequently, the PRC responded to the emergence of this peaceful group by 
establishing a government agency solely entrusted with disbanding the movement and 
disposing of its members. In The 610 Office: Policing the Chinese Spirit, authors Sarah 
Cook and Leeshai Lemish explain that on June 10, 1999, the Chinese government 
established the “610 Office” for the sole and express purpose of effectuating the 
persecution of members of the Falun Gong: “At its core, the 610 Office is a plainclothes 
CCP-based extra-ministerial security force focused on suppressing the Falun Gong 
spiritual group.”14 This government agency, headed by a member of the Politburo 
Standing Committee, was designed not only to prohibit religious expression, but also to 
intimidate practitioners through severe consequences, such as “extrajudicial killings, 
torture, sexual assault, and illegal confiscation of property.”15 
                                                 
13 “Brief Introduction to Falun Dafa,” Falun Dafa, accessed November 27, 2016, http://en.falundafa.org. 
14 Sarah Cook and Leeshai Lemish, “The 610 Office: Policing the Chinese Spirit,” The Jamestown 





 Canadian human rights lawyer David Matas detailed his work on human rights in 
China, particularly as it relates to the Falun Gong in his remarks at the University of Utah 
on September 19, 2014, posted on the website End Organ Pillaging, an international 
coalition to stop the practice in China. “Because my clients flee human rights violations, I 
have become familiar through my work with the human rights situation in many 
countries, including China.”16 Revealing how government-led persecution of Falun Gong 
religious minority members has led to organ harvesting, Matas states:  
The Party has engaged in a prolonged, persistent, vitriolic national and 
international campaign of incitement to hatred against Falun Gong. The 
campaign has prompted their marginalization, depersonalization and 
dehumanization in the eyes of many Chinese nationals. To their jailors, 
Falun Gong are not human beings entitled to respect for their human rights 
and dignity.17  
 
This blatant disregard for personal autonomy and absence of religious freedom shows the 
brutal nature of the Chinese government in quelling dissent. 
 The PRC is also a state well-versed in propaganda and suppressing free speech, 
earning a striking 87/100 (0 indicating “Best,” 100 indicating “Worst”)18 by Freedom 
House, a non-profit organization dedicated to global human rights causes through 
analysis, advocacy, and action.19 Ironically, according to Article 35 of the Constitution of 
the People’s Republic of China, all citizens of the PRC are afforded the right to freedom 
“of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession and of 
                                                 
16 David Matas, “David Matas Combatting in Utah,” End Organ Pillaging, last modified September 19, 
2014, http://endorganpillaging.org/david-matas-in-utah/. 
17 Ibid. 
18 “China,” Freedom House, accessed November 27, 2016, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
press/2016/china. 
19 “Our Work,” Freedom House, accessed November 27, 2016, https://freedomhouse.org/our-work. 
  
9 
demonstration.”20 Moreover, because judges are appointed by the CCP, the PRC fosters a 
legal environment completely absent of protections for journalists, free public access to 
official information, or respect for cybersecurity and freedom from content regulation.21 
Unsurprisingly, hundreds of state-run media agencies follow marching orders and serve 
the interest of top CCP officials rather than broadcast pressing issues that are politically 
sensitive and could blemish the CCP’s reputation: “CCP leaders use control of the media 
to propagate positive views of the party, the government, and the president, while 
vilifying those deemed to be their enemies.”22 With this meager track record of legal 
protection for freedom of speech and expression, even analyzing the current state of 
human rights protections in China is vexing. Yet, one crucial area to consider because of 
its connection to foreign institutions is the current state of academic freedom at Chinese 
universities and U.S. universities in China. 
 In August 2016, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) conducted a 
study on academic freedom in China titled “U.S. Universities in China Emphasize 
Academic Freedom but Face Internet Censorship and Other Challenges.”23 This study 
was conducted after previous research found the state of academic freedom in China had 
worsened in 2015 when compared to other years.24 Focusing on the relationship between 
                                                 
20 “Constitution,” The National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China, last modified March 
14, 2004, http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/2007-11/15/content_1372964.htm. 
21 “China.” 
22 “China.” 
23 “U.S. Universities in China Emphasize Academic Freedom but Face Internet Censorship and Other 





U.S. and Chinese universities, the GAO found that although these university agreements 
typically include language that protects academic freedom, internet censorship was 
pervasive. “About half of universities GAO reviewed address access to information, such 
as providing faculty and students with access to physical or online libraries, though few 
universities’ agreements and policies include language protecting Internet access.”25 In 
addition, many of the agreements also lacked protections for fundamental rights enjoyed 
by U.S. students, such as the protection of “at least one other key freedom—speech, 
assembly, or religion.”26 Finally, although the GAO reported that faculty and students 
indicated that they were able to teach or explore topics of their choosing, at several 
universities with censored internet, they indicated, “they sometimes faced challenges 
teaching, conducting research, and completing coursework.”27 Politically-sensitive topics, 
such as the Tiananmen Square events of 1989 or the China-Taiwan relationship, “were 
[also] avoided in class.”28 
 Damning reports from international organizations concerning the failure to uphold 
standards of academic integrity signify the poor state of human rights in the PRC. 
Regardless of this reality, the PRC has capitalized on the global fascination with Chinese 
language and culture and has become adept at spreading its influence around the world. 
Rather than through coercion or force, the Chinese state has prioritized the expansion of 
language instruction, cultural programming, and performing arts. Politically-speaking, 







this concept is officially known as “soft power.” In Soft Power: The Means to Success in 
World Politics, Harvard University professor Joseph Nye coins the term “soft power” and 
describes it in this way: 
A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because 
other countries – admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its 
level of prosperity and openness – want to follow it. In this sense, it is also 
important to set the agenda and attract others in world politics, and not 
only to force them to change by threatening military force or economic 
sanctions. This soft power – getting others to want the outcomes that you 
want – co-opts people rather than coerces them.29 
 
While Nye specifically describes a state’s foreign policy and geopolitical strategy, by 
inference this cooption may also apply in a contemporary cultural sense as it relates to 
language, history, and the arts, which has profound implications for the subject of this 
thesis. 
 Acknowledging that substantial human rights abuses persist in the West, when 
taken together, an alarming picture emerges. The HRW review, the Tibetan independence 
movement, Falun Gong religious persecution, control over domestic media outlets and 
internet access, and violations of academic freedom and the ability to collect information 
reveal the degree to which human rights are subject to abuse in the PRC. In a rights 
framework, academic freedom correlates with freedom of speech, enabling students and 
citizens to challenge information presented to them, even if it means dissenting from the 
government’s views. Indeed, while it is true that academia is enhanced when both 
students and faculty are both able to explore any subject, China’s draconian prohibitions 
on speech and intellectual freedom make this reality effectively impossible. If this 
                                                 
29 Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 5. 
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represents the current status of speech and academic freedom within China, the 
exportation of such practices through the vessel of Confucius Institutes (CIs) has 
profound implications for non-Chinese students at universities around the world. Before 
delving into CIs and their mission, however, it is critical to explore academic freedom as 
a human right.  
  
13 
CHAPTER THREE: ACADEMIC FREEDOM AS A HUMAN RIGHT 
 
 Academic freedom is a fundamental principal of the academic world, enabling 
scholars to explore topics of their choosing without prohibitions or repercussions. It 
affords students the opportunity to explore any idea and perspective uninhibited while 
protecting a professor’s capability to research and teach topics that may be unorthodox or 
controversial. Concerning the latter, the protection of academic freedom indicates the 
importance of tenure to ensure faculty members are not removed from their position for 
intellectual curiosity or possible nonconformity to orthodox beliefs. To ensure the highest 
quality of education at an institution of higher learning, it is essential that academic 
freedom be both a priority and protected. Moreover, the ability to research any topic and 
pose challenging questions to expand intellectual capacity is not only integral to a 
comprehensive education, but it is also a fundamental human right worthy of 
international protection. Before analyzing academic freedom as a human right, however, 
it is essential to define the concept. 
 The origin of human rights and what constitutes them is the subject of contentious 
debate. From Lynn Hunt’s Inventing Human Rights to Samuel Moyn’s The Last Utopia, 
it is not easily reconciled. Hunt argues that the conception of human rights emerged with 
the American Declaration of Independence and expanded with the development of both 
empathy and individual autonomy among all peoples of all kinds.30 Furthermore, Hunt 
emphasizes the paramount importance of self-evident rights, believing that human rights 
only exist when they are protected within the secular political world, not contingent upon 
                                                 
30 Lynn Hunt, Inventing Human Rights: A History (New York: Norton, 2007), 28. 
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religion but, instead, bolstered by their “equality, universality, and naturalness.”31 In 
contrast, Moyn asserts that human rights did not crystallize until 1977, at which time 
many people began to see human rights as a viable vision for the world after so many 
other transnational ideologies had failed.32 Moyn argues that the conceptions of rights, 
although they have long existed, “were from the beginning part of the authority of the 
state, not invoked to transcend it.”33 While Hunt and Moyn debate its genesis, human 
rights are ultimately fundamental rights enjoyed by all peoples without distinction of any 
kind and granted international protection. As it relates to academic freedom, various 
groups have advocated for granting the concept the same protections as other human 
rights. 
 Domestic protections of academic freedom have emerged throughout the past 
century. In 1915, the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), an 
organization representing over 47,000 professors,34 adopted the Declaration of Principles 
on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure in which they outlined the definition of 
academic freedom as it relates to academia. “Academic freedom…comprises three 
elements: freedom of inquiry and research; freedom of teaching within the university or 
                                                 
31 Hunt, Inventing Human Rights, 21. 
32 Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2012), 4. 
33 Moyn, The Last Utopia, 7. 




college; and freedom of extramural utterance and action.”35 Twenty-five years later in 
1940, the AAUP issued a Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure. In 
it, they assert: 
The purpose of this statement is to promote public understanding and 
support of academic freedom and tenure and agreement upon procedures 
to ensure them in colleges and universities. Institutions of higher 
education are conducted for the common good and not to further the 
interest of either the individual teacher or the institution as a whole. The 
common good depends upon the free search for truth and its free 
exposition.36 
 
Both sources demonstrate the commitment of the official representative body of 
American professors to the notion that academic freedom is integral to academia and its 
promotion must be a core mission of institutions of higher learning. More broadly, 
regardless of grade level, academic freedom without undue burden should be afforded to 
all members of the academic community. However, while both documents provide clear 
evidence for domestic protections of academic freedom, neither expand outside the 
jurisdiction of universities nor claim academic freedom to be worthy of international 
protection. 
 Outside of the classroom and the realm of academia, individuals should have the 
ability to research any topics of their choosing without prohibition and fear of 
repercussions. On April 16, 1963, Martin Luther King Jr. wrote Letter from Birmingham 
                                                 
35 “1915 Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure,” American Association of 
University Professors, accessed November 27, 2016, 
http://www.akronaaup.org/documents/AAUP1915.pdf. PDF. 
36 “1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure,” American Association of University 




Jail, in which he defends nonviolent direct action as the catalyst for positive social 
change and originally used to protect academic freedom.37 Civil disobedience, he writes, 
is an essential strategy in repudiating unjust laws, and he asserts that academic freedom is 
a reality today because of the civil disobedience of Socrates: “To a degree, academic 
freedom is a reality today because Socrates practiced civil disobedience.”38 Within 
classrooms and in social justice movements, “Socratic teaching” is a dialectical teaching 
method in which opposing perspectives are challenged through questions grounded in 
reason, enabling the determination of truth through critical thinking.39 If some topics 
within the intellectual community are barred from discussion, critical thinking and the 
search for truth would be futile. Still, while this view of academic freedom is useful for 
individuals in both academic and social movement settings, neither King nor Socrates 
frame academic freedom as a fundamental human right that should be afforded to all 
human beings without distinction of any kind. 
 
The Case for Academic Freedom as a Human Right 
 
 The Anglo-American conception of academic freedom prioritizes Enlightenment 
values of freedom of thought and the capacity to challenge opposing opinions without 
prohibitions or repercussions. In the university, academic freedom is foundational for 
                                                 








liberal arts and understanding truth. Although it is sacrosanct in Western academia, 
neither the PRC acknowledges its value nor has the international community ever framed 
such a conception as a human right worthy of protection. 
 After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the discussion around academic 
freedom began to be debated within a rights framework. One preeminent advocate for 
academic freedom as a human right is Balakrishnan Rajagopal, director of the Program 
on Human Rights and Justice at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). In his 
2003 essay titled Academic Freedom as a Human Right: An Internationalist Perspective, 
he argues that academic freedom is a fundamental human right deserving of widespread 
protection from the international community. His essay includes an analysis of the true 
meaning of academic freedom in Western academia, specifically as it relates to foreign-
born individuals living in the U.S. 
 Rajagopal defines academic freedom and describes its origins in nineteenth-
century German ideas by using the AAUP’s 1915 Declaration of Principles on Academic 
Freedom.40 As he recounts, some of the earliest, most contentious encounters between 
members of the academic community were “a series of confrontations in the late 
nineteenth century between economics professors and university administrations.”41 One 
instance in particular was the firing of economics professor Edward Ross at Stanford 
University in the early twentieth century for promulgating unorthodox economic ideas. 
Instances such as this brought academic freedom to the forefront of intellectual debates, 
                                                 
40 Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Academic Freedom as a Human Right: An Internationalist Perspective, last 




ultimately leading to the design of academic tenure in order to enable “academics to 
express their views, even if those views transcend narrow disciplinary boundaries.”42 
Rajagopal repudiates the understanding of academic freedom as one that is narrow and 
relegated to one’s field of study.43 
 Rajagopal’s impetus for asserting that academic freedom is a human right 
emerged directly after 9/11 due to the subsequent response of the United States 
government curtailing human rights through acts such as the USA Patriot Act.44 During 
this period, legislation and regulatory acts mandated by the U.S. government had 
profound implications for the intellectual curiosity and livelihoods of foreign-born 
academics and scholars living in the U.S.45 “Now, it seems, the war on terror has 
extended to academia.”46 Before concluding that academic freedom is a human right 
worthy of international protection, Rajagopal defines academic freedom’s origins and 
analyzes academic freedom as a human right in three ways: a U.S. constitutional right of 
an individual, an institutional right of the academy, or an international human right.47 
 The curtailing of academic freedom after 9/11 was regarded as a necessity to 
strengthen national security. “As freedom of expression, opinion, and association come 
under threat as a result of the global war on terror,” Rajagopal writes, “academic 









freedoms are also being targeted.”48 Foreign-born students from some “countries of 
concern” were required to “register with the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service 
and be monitored,” and universities were targeted by the U.S. government for requests 
concerning “invasive information about foreign students.”49 In one instance, due to a 
selection of course material and individual opinion concerning the “War on Terror,” the 
“U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation visited an Iraqi American professor at the 
University of Massachusetts in November 2002 to question him about his alleged anti-
American views.”50 During this time, protections for academic freedom for “scholars of 
Islamic origin or those who hail from Muslim-majority countries” were virtually 
nonexistent.51 In order to ensure that teaching or research not be criminalized or seen as a 
threat, Rajagopal formulated various ways in which academic freedom could be 
protected. This research supports Rajagopal’s argument and asserts that any protection 
besides that which is international is inadequate. 
 Evidence suggests that U.S. government protections are not adequate for 
protecting academic freedom as a human right. In 1967, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled 5-
4 in Keyishian v. Board of Regents that states cannot prohibit employees from being 
members of the Communist Party due to broad and vague laws.52 Specifically, the Court 
determined, “Academic freedom is a special concern of the First Amendment, which does 
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not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.”53 Here, “pall of 
orthodoxy” connotes a veil over the classroom that prohibits free discussion and the 
interchanging of ideas. Yet, precedent also exists that demonstrates how such First 
Amendment concerns can be eclipsed by national security interests if the case involves 
speech that is deterred by the U.S. government. 
 Particularly during the Cold War and the crackdown on “communist 
sympathizers,” academic freedoms were frequently curtailed in the name of national 
security. In the 1972 case of Kleindienst v. Mandel, the Supreme Court “refused to find 
any First Amendment rights of American academics to ‘receive information and ideas’54 
from a Belgian professor with communist leanings.”55 If academic freedom were a U.S. 
constitutional right entitled to all individuals, it would not be a human right but, instead, 
as Rajagopal states, a “limited freedom.”56 While precedent exists in American common 
law that protects academic freedom, merely framing academic freedom as a right of 
Americans is not adequate to justifying it as a human right. 
Institutionalized university protections for academic freedom, which Rajagopal 
calls a “collective right of the academic body, or as a corporate right of the university,”57 
are also inadequate. In the 1957 case Sweezy v. New Hampshire, Justice Felix Frankfurter 
wrote in a concurring opinion that a university “ceases to be true to its own nature if it 
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becomes the tool of Church or State or any sectional interest. A university is 
characterized by the spirit of free inquiry.”58 This implies that academic freedom is 
potentially an individual right and a “collective right of the institution….”59 However, 
while the academic body could be entrusted to defend academic freedom, the concern 
persists that there may be a general consensus to “disown” a faculty member — or 
possibly a student — if they hold radical or unorthodox views.60 Due to this uncertainty, 
entrusting individual universities to protect academic freedom also fails to enshrine such 
a concept as a fundamental human right. 
 To truly ensure academic freedom is protected against national laws or 
regulations, it must be declared as a human right worthy of international protection. As 
Rajagopal describes, “To say that something is a human right is to assert two things: first, 
that protecting such a right does not depend on national legal systems, but on 
international law; and, second, that transnational action, including that by international 
agencies, becomes legitimate for protecting such rights.”61 By inference, protection from 
the international community would place academic freedom as a human right just as 
deserving of global protection as rights such as religious freedom, freedom from torture, 
and access to clean water. Furthermore, academic freedom as a human right is made 
possible when arguing that it is inseparable from the human rights to free expression and 
education. 
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 The international community has already enshrined free expression and education 
as international human rights, even if individual states have not accepted their legitimacy. 
In December 1966, the United Nations General Assembly adopted both the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) to legally bind the human rights listed in 
the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.62 Both documents offer insight as to 
how academic freedom, when connected with freedom of expression and right to 
education, may be protected as a human right. The ICCPR includes the declaration that 
“Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression” and “Everyone shall have the 
right to hold opinions without interference.”63 The importance of this language cannot be 
understated: using a positive rights framework, every human being is entitled to their 
opinion without repercussions. 
 Furthermore, the document declares, “this right shall include freedom to seek, 
receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers.”64 In 
addition, the ICESCR declares that the member states present “recognize the right of 
everyone to education…[and] agree that education shall be directed to the full 
development of the human personality and the sense of its dignity, and shall strengthen 
the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.”65 Simply stated, every human 
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being has a right to education. It is also important to note that the U.S. has ratified the 
ICCPR while China has not, but China has ratified the ICESCR while the U.S. has not. 
 In addition, in Right to Education: Scope and Implementation, members of the 
UN Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights follow the ICESCR with an 
elaboration on article 13, the section dealing with the human right to education. “[The] 
Committee has formed the view that the right to education can only be enjoyed if 
accompanied by the academic freedom of staff and students.”66 Moreover, members of 
the Committee state that academic freedom is so important because “staff and students in 
higher education are especially vulnerable to political and other pressures which 
undermine academic freedom.”67 The document continues to assert the following:  
Members of the academic community, individually or collectively, are 
free to pursue, develop and transmit knowledge and ideas, through 
research, teaching, study, discussion, documentation, production, creation 
or writing. Academic freedom includes the liberty of individuals to 
express freely opinions about the institution or system in which they work, 
to fulfill their functions without discrimination or fear of repression by the 
State or any other actor, to participate in professional or representative 
academic bodies, and to enjoy all the internationally recognized human 
rights applicable to other individuals in the same jurisdiction. The 
enjoyment of academic freedom carries with it obligations, such as the 
duty to respect the academic freedom of others, to ensure the fair 
discussion of contrary views, and to treat all without discrimination on any 
of the prohibited grounds.68 
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After analyzing academic freedom and international protections, the Committee 
asserts that universities should be free from outside, corrupting influences and maintain 
institutional autonomy. “The enjoyment of academic freedom requires the autonomy of 
institutions of higher education. Autonomy is that degree of self-governance necessary 
for effective decision-making by institutions of higher education in relation to their 
academic work, standards, management and related activities.”69 
Through reliance on current international covenants and views concerning the 
human right to education and freedom of expression, this research determines that 
academic freedom is a human right worthy of international protection. As Rajagopal 
states, “A human right to education injects an ethical dimension into academic freedom 
by broadening the objectives of education. That is, academic freedom exists so that 
individual professors and their institutions can pursue important educational 
objectives.”70 It is a right that ensures the capability to explore any topic without 
prohibition and repercussions and one that should be afforded to every human being 
without distinction of any kind. As Rajagopal states, “[Asserting] academic freedom as a 
human right has become a moral and political imperative across the globe.”71 As this 
thesis asserts, the argument that protection of academic freedom is a moral and political 
imperative is strikingly appropriate as it relates to the PRC’s infiltration of institutions of 
higher learning around the world through vessels that mask human rights abuses known 
as Confucius Institutes. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: CONFUCIUS INSTITUTES: EXPORTING HUMAN RIGHTS 
ABUSES ABROAD 
 
In June 2004, a pilot institute in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, designed to promote Chinese 
language learning and facilitate international cultural exchange was created by the PRC. 
Five months later, the first official Confucius Institute (CI) was unveiled in Seoul, South 
Korea. In 2017, over 500 CIs around the world and 1000 Confucius Classrooms exist at 
“foreign primary schools, secondary schools, communities and enterprises,” including 
locations in Asia, Africa, the Americas, Europe, and Oceania.72 The PRC seeks to have 
1,000 CIs instituted around the world by 2020.73 
The conversation surrounding CIs is incredibly polarizing, ranging from praise for 
their innovative approach to language and cultural dissemination to repudiating their 
establishment as gross Chinese propaganda. Indeed, despite widespread perceptions, CIs 
are not simply autonomous organizations designed to teach Mandarin Chinese. This 
chapter will analyze how CIs are integral to Chinese public diplomacy, how their strict 
governance and regulations suffocate university autonomy, and the questionable behavior 
of Hanban and CI leadership. Following this section is an analysis of various criticisms 
and concerns of CIs, which shows how and why CIs violate basic standards of academic 
freedom and why either removing them entirely or instituting commonsense regulations 
is in the best interest of all institutions of higher learning. 
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Chinese Public Diplomacy or Chinese Propaganda? 
 
 While some argue that CIs are emblematic of crude propaganda, others contend 
that CIs are merely one mechanism of the PRC to conduct public diplomacy. Although 
both propaganda and public diplomacy involve conveying state-approved information, 
the latter is not a one-way street and involves constructive dialogue. Understanding 
modern Chinese public diplomacy is essential for understanding why CIs have been 
created, which is to broadcast the PRC’s version of China to the world. Like most 
developing countries, especially those who are not categorized by Western hegemony, 
the PRC is intensely interested in successful public diplomacy. Due to the historically-
negative media attention China receives primarily in Western media, modern Chinese 
public diplomacy strives to combat negative stereotypes and present China’s 
development as both cooperative with foreign states and peaceful. One mechanism by 
which the PRC connects with the rest of the world is by capitalizing on the global 
fascination with Chinese language and culture. By prioritizing the expansion of CIs 
around the world, one way China seeks to cultivate higher respectability around the world 
is through cooperation with universities and primary and secondary schools. 
 With the unpredictability of the future of the PRC, the Chinese government is 
intensely concerned over its international status and image. In Chinese public diplomacy: 
the rise of the Confucius Institute, Falk Hartig, a post-doctoral researcher at Goethe 
University presents “the first comprehensive analysis of Confucius Institutes (CIs), 
situating them as a tool of public diplomacy in the broader context of China’s foreign 
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affairs.”74 He crafts his argument not as a criticism of CIs, but as a perspective to 
demonstrate that they are merely the first point of contact for many individuals interested 
in Mandarin Chinese and the Chinese culture. Hartig argues that CIs are integral to 
Chinese foreign policy objectives, mechanisms of Chinese public diplomacy, and 
analyzes how CIs are cultural outposts designed to sell a “correct version of China” 
directed at an audience relatively unaware of the PRC.75 For China, “Public diplomacy is 
seen as a means for telling [its] story to the world and thereby countering the negative 
accounts of the country in foreign, mainly Western, media.”76 
 While there are many definitions of public diplomacy and state diplomatic 
communication, Hartig offers one definition as it relates to two states as 
[The] promotion of national interests and therefore should not be 
discounted as a ‘soft’ instrument or merely an altruistic affair. In the 
service of national interest, public diplomacy is about making friends and 
isolating enemies, promoting political dialogue, supporting trade and 
foreign investment, establishing links with civil society and it engages in 
the often quoted battle for hearts and minds.77 
 
Because of Western stereotypes about China and the PRC’s perceived challenge to 
the international status quo, Chinese public diplomacy is often phrased as “peaceful 
development.”78 This terminology signifies a commitment to multilateral cooperation and 
achieving Chinese state strength not through military prowess, but through constructive 
dialogue and cooperation, harkening back to Joseph Nye’s notion of “soft power.” 
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However, Hartig admits that “While China wants to project the narrative of a peacefully 
developing country that aims to construct a Harmonious World, the global audience 
mainly perceives it as the big guy in the crowd who actually pushes others around and 
stands in their way.”79 
 In general, public diplomacy can be categorized as “old” or “new.” “Old” public 
diplomacy is understood as a “state/government centric endeavor, characterised by a one-
way flow of information in which actors control the messages by making instrumentalist 
use of channels and allow only limited interactions between the sending and receiving 
side,”80 while “new” public diplomacy generally consists of “an emphasis on greater 
exchange and collaboration as well as dialogue, new technologies, and new actors such as 
non-governmental organisations, advocacy groups, or non-state actors.”81 When applying 
these definitions to CIs, it is fascinating that they operate as both “old” and “new” public 
diplomacy: state-led but focused on foreign, non-governmental organizations in order to 
tell China’s story.82  
 Hartig contends that international relations and understanding a state’s foreign 
policy objectives is more complex than broadly labeling government-approved 
information as propaganda. He asserts that CIs are ultimately more connected to Chinese 
public diplomacy due to their capacity to build relationships with local stakeholders. As 
he illustrates, “[While] China would describe its Confucius Institutes as a benign 
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instrument of public diplomacy or cultural exchange, critics perceive them as examples 
of crude state-directed propaganda; and while Western countries would use their public 
diplomacy to spread universal values, countries like China would strongly guard against 
what it interprets as the infiltration of highly unwelcomed values.”83 However, this does 
not negate the fact that there is a profound difference between the “real” versus the 
“correct” China, the latter being the version CIs are designed to preserve and promulgate 
around the world. 
 CIs are also useful to the Chinese state for more than Mandarin Chinese 
promotion and cultural exchange. “For China’s economy and trade, Confucius Institutes 
can provide competitive advantages through language and cultural consulting.”84 In this 
regard, Chinese public diplomacy through CIs is a proactive approach to strategic 
positioning in an increasingly-globalized economy and world. Because of the multi-
faceted nature of CIs, this raises the question whether Chinese public diplomacy is more 
emblematic of Chinese imperialism rather than “soft power.” Because imperialism 
typically involves exploitation and territorial acquisition, this thesis argues that CIs are 
more representative of the latter than the former. Once more returning to Joseph Nye’s 
definition of “soft power,” CIs co-opt, rather than coerce, individuals to become 
interested in Chinese language and culture. As Hartig describes, “The soft power of a 
country rests primarily on its culture, its political values, and its foreign policies.”85 
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 Due to the considerable gap between how China wants to be seen in the world and 
how the world sees China, CIs, acting as agents of Chinese public diplomacy, are 
inherently designed to represent the self-fashioning of the PRC. The “real” China 
connotes an uncensored version of the Chinese state where government censorship is not 
omnipresent. The “correct” China conveys an understanding of the PRC as being absent 
of all blemishes that may mar its self-proclaimed peaceful rise. Unfortunately, because of 
the undemocratic and authoritarian nature of the PRC, selling the PRC as it wants to be 
seen is futile. As Hartig acknowledges, “[It] does not matter how many Confucius 
Institutes promote the Chinese language and Chinese culture across the globe, and it does 
not matter how well they do so; as long as the Chinese government continues to arrest 
human rights lawyers, censor the media and bullies its East Asian neighbours, all efforts 
by Confucius Institutes to promote China’s image can only hit a wall.”86 
 Indeed, despite the billions of dollars invested in improving its global image in 
addition to the expansion of Confucius Institutes, Western audiences have not bought into 
China’s public diplomacy being anything more than crude propaganda. On March 23, 
2017, The Economist published an article titled “China is spending billions to make the 
world love it.” Referencing “soft power,” The Economist writes: 
[When] Mr Nye wrote about soft power, he suggested that governments 
could not manufacture it. He argued that much of America’s had sprung 
from its civil society: “everything from universities and foundations to 
Hollywood and pop culture”. The party is distrustful of civil society; its 
soft-power building has been almost entirely state-led. China has tried to 
combine elements of soft power with the hard power of its illiberal 
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politics. Far from enhancing China’s global image, this approach has often 
served to undermine it.87 
 
The Economist also provides a graph that demonstrates global audiences have not been 
fooled by Chinese cultural promotion abroad. 
 
 
Global Chinese language instruction and cultural programming through official 
state-run entities generally benefits both the PRC’s foreign policy objectives and 
economic opportunities. However, Chinese public diplomacy does not venerate the 
Anglo-American conception of academic freedom, meaning that regardless of the reason 
for creating CIs and how they benefit the Chinese state, the protection of academic 
freedom is not a priority of the PRC. When analyzing CIs as representative of Chinese 
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public diplomacy or propaganda, the latter definition is both more apt and more accurate. 
Additionally, the strict governance and regulation of CIs prioritizes stability and 
contributes to violations of academic freedom. 
 
Strict Governance and Strict Regulations 
 
CIs are primarily located at universities of higher learning in liberal democracies, 
managed and funded directly by the Chinese government through the Office of Chinese 
Language Council International, more commonly known as Hanban. Although CIs 
market themselves as focusing mainly on Chinese language instruction in local primary 
and secondary schools, it is essential to break through this veil and dissect their strict 
governance structure and what regulations exist that make them subordinate to the will of 
the Chinese state. Although there are numerous policies governing hundreds of CIs, this 
is a brief analysis of how strict governance and state regulations violate university 
standards of academic freedom. 
 Hanban exists under the authority of the Chinese Ministry of Education and 
headed by a senior CCP education official.88 It is comprised of twenty divisions: General 
Affairs, Human Resources, Legal Affairs, Accounting and Auditing, Finance, Assets 
Management, Development and Planning, Policy Studies, Asian and African Confucius 
Institutes, American and Oceanian Confucius Institutes, European Confucius Institutes, 
Teachers, Volunteer Affairs, Teaching Materials, Chinese Testing and Scholarship, 
Cultural Affairs, Sinology and China Studies, International Exchanges, Confucius 
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Institute Magazine (an Editorial Division), and Logistics.89 This composition signifies 
that any policy set forth by Hanban is a directive of the PRC. 
 Hanban is designed and overseen by the Chinese government to pursue three core 
functions: “To make policies and development plans for promoting Chinese language 
internationally; [to] support Chinese language programs at educational institutions of 
various types and levels in other countries; [and to] draft international Chinese teaching 
standards and develop and promote Chinese language teaching materials.”90 As it relates 
to their connection with CIs, Hanban’s website offers an anodyne description of its 
operation: “Hanban/Confucius Institute Headquarters, as a public institution affiliated 
with the Chinese Ministry of Education, is committed to providing Chinese language and 
cultural teaching resources and services worldwide, it goes all out in meeting the 
demands of foreign Chinese learners and contributing to the development of 
multiculturalism and the building of a harmonious world.”91 
 The most helpful resource in understanding CI regulations is the “Constitution 
and By-Laws of the Confucius Institutes.” This resource is “applicable to all Confucius 
Institutes worldwide.”92 While this thesis will not dissect every line of this document, a 
few striking quotes will be used to demonstrate how CIs have little to no individual 
autonomy. This document ensures that all CIs, without exception, will “abide by the laws 








and regulations of the countries in which they are located, respect local cultural and 
educational traditions and social customs, and they shall not contravene concerning the 
laws and regulations of China.”93 In other words, inquisitive students are prohibited from 
discussing topics deemed sensitive or objectionable to the Chinese government with a CI 
teacher. According to this document, the primary purpose of CIs is to 
[Devote] themselves to satisfying the demands of people from different 
countries and regions in the world who learn the Chinese language, to 
enhancing understanding of the Chinese language and culture by these 
peoples, to strengthening educational and cultural exchange and 
cooperation between China and other countries, to deepening friendly 
relationships with other nations, to promoting the development of multi-
culturalism, and to construct a harmonious world.94 
 
 On the national level, the daily operation of the Confucius Institute Headquarters, 
the official administrative residency of CI leadership in Beijing, is carried out under the 
leadership of the Council. The Council is comprised of “the Chair, the Vice Chairs, the 
Executive Council Members, and the Council Members.”95 While these members are 
“recommended by the education administrative agency of the Chinese State Council and 
approved by the State Council,”96 the fifteen Council Members are comprised in the 
following way: ten Council Members shall be the “Heads of the Board of Directors of 
Confucius Institutes overseas” and the other five are “representatives of Chinese partner 
institutions, appointed directly by the Headquarters.”97 The “daily operation” of the 








Confucius Institute Headquarters includes “Formulating and amending the Constitution 
and By-Laws of the Confucius Institutes, examining and approving the development 
strategies and plans of global Confucius Institutes, examining and approving annual 
reports and working plans of the Headquarters, and discussing issues of significance 
concerning the development of Confucius Institutes.”98 
 The composition of the Council is rigidly hierarchical and highly resistant to 
change, which has implications for the establishment of CIs. While not every CI 
placement originates from Beijing (foreign organizations may request the establishment 
of a CI), Hanban oversees approving the establishment of all CIs. As the Constitution and 
By-Laws state, “Any corporate entity outside of China capable of facilitating language 
instruction, conducting educational and cultural exchange activities, and meeting the 
requirements for application as stated in this Constitution and By-Laws may apply to the 
Confucius Institute Headquarters for the permission to establish a Confucius Institute.”99 
Additionally, all host organizations, namely universities, with a CI must have a partner 
Chinese organization, which is often, but not always, a Chinese university. It is this 
element of CIs that makes them unique when compared to other nationally-sponsored 
educational initiatives. 
 CIs are established as joint ventures primarily between Chinese universities and 
universities around the world. This makes CIs unique when compared to the Western 
organizations such as the British Council, Germany’s Goethe-Institut, and France’s 





L’Alliance Franςaise, which almost always act independently. According to Hartig, 
“These organisations, although acting independently, are also working for their 
governments and their government's foreign policy goals. The fundamental difference, 
however, is in the nature of the political system Confucius Institute [sic] represent and the 
way they are structured and organised.”100 The joint venture structure of CIs also helps 
the PRC detach CIs from the Chinese state and gain credibility with already-reputable 
institutions. 
 The joint venture aspect of public diplomacy further contributes to cost 
effectiveness of CIs because they rely on local expertise. Hartig explains the importance 
of local expertise in this way: “[Local] stakeholders have profound local knowledge that 
is helpful for almost any aspect of the work of Confucius Institutes, ranging from 
knowing the host university, public bodies for any kind of necessary administrative and 
bureaucratic matters such as handling resident permits for dispatched staff, knowing local 
sponsors and knowing local audience.”101 This connection with reputable individuals and 
institutions serves as the catalyst for disconnecting CIs from the Chinese state, and it also 
serves as a cost-effective measure in CI establishment. 
 As for the operation of each individual CI at their host institution, each is required 
to establish a Board of Directors, consisting of members from both the CI and the host 
institution. The responsibilities of the Board of Directors include “assessing and 
approving the Confucius Institute’s development plans, annual plans, annual reports, 
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project implementation schemes, budget proposals, [and] final financial accounts.”102 
One of the major tasks of the Board of Directors is delegating power to one Director, who 
acts on behalf of the Board and is ultimately beholden to their collective will. The 
Director must “have in-depth comprehension of Chinese current national issues, a skillful 
command of the language of the country in which the Institute is located, suitable 
administrative experiences in this position, and a strong ability to promote public 
affiliation and market potential.”103  
 Clearly, neither the Director nor Board of Directors have individual autonomy. As 
the Constitution and By-Laws show: 
An individual Confucius Institute, in the allotted time, shall draw up 
executable plans for annual projects and budget proposals, summarizing 
the implemental [sic] efficacy reports of annual projects and final financial 
accounts, and submit them to the Headquarters for examination and 
approval. Changes and dispositions made to the assets on the Chinese side 
shall be reported to the Headquarters for examination and approval. 
Individual Confucius Institutes shall also submit the working schedules 
and summaries of their annual projects to the Headquarters for archiving 
purposes.104 
 
Based on this section, one can infer that failure to report and receive approval of a 
cultural event with the CI Headquarters is grounds for taking an individual CI to court, 
which has chilling implications in a university setting. Finally, “The Confucius Institute 
Headquarters shall be responsible for conducting assessments of individual Confucius 
Institutes. The Headquarters reserves the right to terminate the Agreements with those 
                                                 





Institutes that violate the principles or objectives, or fail to reach the teaching quality 
standards set forth by the head establishment.”105  
 The CI Constitution and By-Laws also stipulate what business services must be 
offered through CIs, a requirement for designated space at the host institution, a necessity 
for the abundance of appropriate resources for language and cultural instruction, and 
evidence that there exists “a demand for learning the Chinese language and culture at the 
applicant’s location.”106 The business services that must be offered are as follows: 
Chinese language teaching; training Chinese language instructors and 
providing Chinese language teaching resources; holding the HSK 
examination (Chinese Proficiency Test) and tests for the Certification of 
the Chinese Language Teachers; providing information and consultative 
services concerning China’s education, culture, and so forth; [and] 
conducting language and cultural exchange activities between China and 
other countries.107  
 
This section shows that CI teachers cannot utilize non-PRC university materials 
relating to China and the Chinese government. As such, all CIs enjoy “the right of 
priority for obtaining teaching and cultural materials or resources provided by the 
Headquarters.”108 While some would argue this benefits host institutions since funding 
would not be necessary to purchase pedagogical materials, there is perhaps no greater 
example of how CI autonomy is subsumed than the requirement to use Chinese-state 
authorized textbooks rather than textbooks approved by the host country or host 
institution. 







 The Constitution and By-Laws also stipulates that start-up funding (typically 
$100,000) for CIs be provided by Hanban, boosting the incentive for universities to 
accept the Chinese government’s offer. It pledges that a “newly established Confucius 
Institute will receive aid to its initial operation in the form of a set amount of funds 
provided by the Chinese Parties…[and] the funds for its annual projects shall be raised by 
individual Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Parties together in a ratio of 
approximately 1:1 commitment in general.”109 According to Hartig, “The Chinese side 
provides international partners with start-up funding of about US$100,000 for the first 
years….”110 Particularly in the U.S. where budget cuts to higher education are perennial 
and commonplace in most states, universities are jumping at alternative sources of 
funding regardless of their origin.111 That this partial funding comes from an 
authoritarian, one-party regime is seen not as a threat to the mission of the academic 
institution but, instead, as an opportunity to connect with a rising global superpower, and 
the university will not even have to foot the bill. Ironically, the Chinese government is 
spending less than local institutions for the functioning of CIs. A 2014 work report on the 
global reception of CIs reveals that “the amount of foreign-partner side cash expenditure, 
personnel, teaching facilities and utilities cost totalled US$443 million and the total 
amount of Chinese expenditure was US$295 million.”112 
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 Finally, CIs are restricted because of teacher selection. The only mention of 
teacher selection in the Constitution and By-Laws is listed alongside the responsibilities 
of the Director and obligations of local-level CI governance, and it is noticeably lacking 
in detail: “Instructors appointed by Confucius Institutes shall have professional 
knowledge and teaching competence required by such positions as teachers.”113 While 
there are numerous clauses that mandate CI teacher “training,” the official selection 
process for teachers is completely absent from the document. A few articles on Hanban’s 
website translated in English, however, list the qualifications for becoming a CI teacher.  
 Titled “Overseas Volunteer Chinese Teacher Program” and focused on the need 
to “enhance the world’s understanding of Chinese language and culture,”114 the 
qualifications to become a CI educator are standard, with one notable exception. Firstly, 
Hanban requires “Those of willing and spirit of cooperation and dedication, in Chinese 
language teaching.”115 Secondly, they require a “Bachelor degree or above and standard 
Mandarin.”116 Thirdly, a candidate must be “Aged between 22 to 60, physical and mental 
healthy, no record of participation in Falun Gong and other illegal organizations and no 
criminal record.”117 Fourthly, they must be “Qualified to teach Chinese language teaching 
in the country (region) or with certain experience and skills in Chinese language 
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teaching.”118 And fifthly, candidates must have “communication and cross-cultural 
communication capacity for living and working in the country.”119 The third qualification 
is the one that raises the greatest concern, significantly constraining a CI educator’s 
freedom of religion and expression. 
 Universities that value academic freedom are defined by institutional autonomy, 
enabling scholars to conduct research without seeking approval from a hierarchical 
governing body concerned with censoring topics in the name of political stability. The 
Constitution and By-Laws demand a strict governance structure and numerous 
regulations that places the authority of all CIs in Hanban. While seemingly non-
controversial, the rigid hierarchy of Hanban and CIs creates an institutional environment 
of non-transparency and aversion to change. Moreover, the supply of Chinese funding to 
create CIs implies that while American state funding for higher education declines, CIs 
could come to play a greater role — if not take over — East Asian studies departments in 
the future. 
 
Alarming Executive Leadership 
 
The presence of corruption and administrative chicanery is rife among top CI 
leaders, raising numerous questions about the ethical standards under which CIs operate. 
No CI leader has been in the spotlight more concerning this behavior than a vice-
minister-level official on the Chinese State Council — the chief administrative authority 





of the PRC — and the Chief Executive of the Confucius Institute Headquarters and 
Director General of Hanban since 2004, Madam Xu Lin. A young woman during the 
Cultural Revolution, Xu Lin was a worker at the Changzhi Bicycle Factory in China’s 
Shanxi province.120 In addition to graduating from Fudan University in Shanghai with a 
degree in Chemistry and attaining a master's degree in Economics from Beijing Normal 
University, Xu Lin eventually began to be involved with CCP governance, becoming 
Assistant Mayor of Xuchang, Henan province and Director of the Foreign Loans Office 
of the Ministry of Education, among other positions.121 In her current position as head of 
Hanban, Xu Lin has been involved in a few controversies that challenge the integrity of 
Hanban and CIs.  
 One of the most prominent instances of questionable censorship occurred in 2014. 
The event was the European Association for Chinese Studies (EACS) conference in 
Portugal. The controversy at the EACS conference on July 22, 2014, involved her and CI 
educators ripping out pages of the conference agenda that dealt with Taiwanese academic 
institutions and the Taiwanese Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation for International Scholarly 
Exchange, a sponsor of the conference for twenty years.122 A few days following the 
conference, in a formal letter titled “Letter of Protest at Interference in EACS Conference 
in Portugal, July 2014,” Roger Greatrex, president of EACS, condemned the actions of 
Vice-Minister Xu Lin as utterly inappropriate, an “arbitrary seizure of conference 
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materials and deletion of pages in an unauthorized manner,” and “extremely 
injudicious.”123 Although Hanban had effectively provided a grant to the conference to 
cover program costs, Greatrex said there was no formal request to remove particular 
pages.124 “Such interference in the internal organization of the international conference of 
an independent and democratically organized non-profitable academic organization is 
totally unacceptable.”125  
 While it is not entirely clear what sections of the program Xu Lin deemed 
contrary to Chinese laws or regulations, it may be inferred that any mention of Taiwanese 
self-determination or existence outside the authority of the PRC was grounds for 
censoring conference materials for a democratically-organized academic organization. 
Regardless, the Global Times, another state-run media agency related to the People’s 
Daily, praised Xu Lin’s actions as patriotism126 and revealed how non-Chinese scholars 
working with Hanban are expected to master the art of self-censorship. Outside the 
auspices of the Chinese state, in response to this incident, the Wall Street Journal 
described Xu Lin’s behavior in an article titled “Beijing's Propaganda Lessons” as the 
“bullying approach to academic freedom.”127  
 In another example of Xu Lin’s leadership, her interview with the British 
Broadcasting Corporation’s (BBC) in 2014 captures her reaction to the inability for 
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students to pose tough questions to CI teachers. When asked about teacher contracts and 
prohibition of membership in the Falun Gong regardless of if they are located on a 
university campus within the U.S., Canada, or any other state that promotes freedom of 
religious expression, Xu Lin replied, “When we send our teachers to go abroad, they 
must be a citizen of China. To be a Chinese citizen, they must obey Chinese law. 
According to Chinese law, no, Chinese law does not allow a teacher to be free to teach or 
say that Falun Gong is good in the campus. No. In our campus, you cannot. No. This is 
our law.”128 
 With this response, the leader of all CIs confirms that Falun Gong practitioners 
are prohibited from instructing the Chinese language as CI teachers, even if their 
religious beliefs do not violate the CI host country’s laws. When asked if the Chinese 
teachers in CIs were free from Communist Party control, the BBC writes that Ms. Xu was 
certain “that her teachers are free from political control...because all teachers have to 
write a report at the end of their postings and are questioned on their return about whether 
they faced politically sensitive questions from students.”129 Perhaps there is no better 
indication of the presence of political meddling or non-neutral monitoring of foreigners 
learning Mandarin Chinese than teachers having to take a test upon return to China about 
tough questions to which they were exposed.  
Finally, when asked what a CI teacher would say if a student asked about the issue 
of Taiwanese independence, she replied, “Every mainland teacher we send, all of them 
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will say Taiwan belongs to China. We should have one China. No hesitation.”130 While 
the one-China policy is the official position of both the PRC and the U.S., the implication 
that a student, whether they are at a university or in a Confucius Classroom in a primary 
or secondary school, is not allowed to discuss the history of Chinese nationalist 
resettlement strikes at the very core of the absence of academic freedom. In addition to 
their public diplomacy implications, this raises serious questions about the underlying 
political motivations for creating CIs. As the BBC writes, the CI mission is “coupled with 
a wider foreign policy goal - the bid to make China a cultural superpower, not just an 
economic one.”131 Ironically, for this to occur, CIs must function primarily at academic 
institutions, where they prohibit students from enjoying the academic freedom to explore 
politically-sensitive topics. As such, CIs around the world have received criticisms from 




















CHAPTER FIVE: CONFUCIUS INSTITUTE CRITICISMS AND CONCERNS 
 
The previous sections have analyzed the creation of CIs as integral parts of Chinese 
public diplomacy, their strict governance structure’s jeopardizing of the autonomy of 
universities, and questionable leadership over all CIs. The following section will show 
how and why CIs violate academic freedom drawing from numerous criticisms and 
concerns about their operation and transparency. This section will focus primarily on 
foreign criticisms of CIs, incorporating some domestic concerns. Before analyzing 
various concerns, it also presents counterarguments that criticisms of CIs are unfounded 
and over-exaggerated. 
 In a 2011 article in The Diplomat titled “Confucius Controversy,” Ulara 
Nakagawa writes, “after speaking to a range of people I’ve seen little to support the 
notion of Confucius Institutes as ominous propaganda.”132 Similarly, only three years 
later, The George Washington University professor of History and International Affairs 
writes an article in The Diplomat titled “Confucius Institutes: Hardly a Threat to 
Academic Freedoms.” In this piece, he suggests that detractors of CIs do not have the 
evidence to reinforce their claim that they violate academic freedom. “In the absence of 
reports of widespread problems or abuses, it seem [sic] that the main worries about 
Confucius Institutes have not been substantiated.”133 
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 Various host organizations, reputable news sources, and scholars, however, have 
criticized the operation of CIs. One of the primary reasons for these criticisms stems from 
the fact that a state with pervasive human rights abuses is spearheading an overseas 
educational initiative. While state-promoted entities that encourage the promotion of 
language learning and cultural competency have existed for decades, such as the British 
Council, Goethe-Institut, and L’Alliance Franςaise, the requirement for such an entity to 
exist primarily at institutions of higher learning is a recent creation. Several episodes 
throughout the world raise troubling questions about the integrity of CIs. 
 Human rights advocacy groups have consistently repudiated the influence of CIs 
and their presence at universities, fearful that they effectively serve as trojan horses for 
Chinese educators to disseminate PRC propaganda. The topic of the contested region of 
Tibet and refusal of the Chinese government to acknowledge the authority of the Dalai 
Lama and independence of the Tibetan people is one that CI teachers are exclusively 
prohibited from discussing. As demonstrated by the work of Students for a Free Tibet 
(SFT) and their belief that “every individual has the right to be free,”134 it is no surprise 
that an entire section of the SFT website is dedicated to CIs, titled “Protect Academic 
Freedom: Say No To Confucius Institutes.”135  
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An image featured on the SFT website depicts an outlined human hand painted as 
the PRC flag attempting to veil text that says, “Protect Academic Freedom: Say No To 
Confucius Institutes” and provides a link to protectacademicfreedom.org.136  
 
Some of the most revealing information about why the movement opposes CIs is in 
a section titled “What is the threat of Confucius Institutes?” Here, the group claims that 
“Chinese government censorship and propaganda on topics such as Tibet, Taiwan and 
Tiananmen are reaching our students in high schools and universities all over the 
world.”137 As such, “Chinese government-backed Confucius Institutes are making an 
insidious attempt to restrict academic freedom by silencing debate on human rights and 
other sensitive issues, and whitewash its atrocious human rights records in Tibet and 
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China.”138 In addition, a number of reputable news sources and scholars have also 
denounced the operation of CIs at institutions of higher learning. 
 In a print edition of The Economist on October 22, 2009, the editors claim in an 
article titled “A message from Confucius” that CIs are vessels of Chinese “soft power,” 
serve to fill the gap of foreign attraction to China due to the PRC’s political model and 
human rights abuses, and expose former CCP leader Li Changchun’s statement that CIs 
are “an important part of China's overseas propaganda set-up.”139 The editors write the 
following: 
China’s decision to rely on Confucius as the standard-bearer of its soft-
power projection is an admission that communism lacks pulling power. 
Long gone are the days when Chairman Mao was idolised by radicals (and 
even respected by some mainstream academics) on American university 
campuses. Mao vilified Confucius as a symbol of the backward 
conservatism of pre-communist China. Now the philosopher, who lived in 
the 6th century BC, has been recast as a promoter of peace and 
harmony….”140 
 
 In a 2011 China Heritage Quarterly article titled “Confucius Institutes and 
Controlling Chinese Languages,” The Australian National University’s Michael 
Churchman, a PhD scholar in Chinese history, excoriates CIs as, essentially, CCP 
propaganda machines and vessels of linguistic manipulation to bolster PRC influence. 
Firstly, he illustrates precisely why CIs are vastly different creatures than other state-
promoted entities by stating that while they are similar to other state-backed institutions, 
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the requirement to be “founded within pre-existing international educational institutions” 
is a discomforting new concept, which leads to “a widely-held suspicion that these 
institutes are aimed less at fostering interest in China and Chinese culture itself, and more 
at ensuring that such interest is guided along lines approved of by the Chinese party-
state.”141 
 Churchman’s argument against CIs stems not from their educators’ proximity to, 
and inability to, answer challenging questions from inquisitive scholars, but from the 
language instruction itself. “It is naïve to believe that Confucius Institutes are politically 
disinterested teachers [sic] imparting Chinese culture and language. They exist for the 
express purpose of letting foreigners understand China on terms acceptable to official 
China.”142 Indeed, the mechanism by which these teachers convey these terms acceptable 
to Beijing is through Standard Chinese language learning. Ostensibly, promoting the 
learning of the Chinese language, the most important task of all CIs, is an innocuous task. 
However, the truth is that the language used by the PRC, Mandarin Chinese, is their own 
regulated, “simplified” creation, emblematic of cultural erasure of thousands of years of 
Chinese history and a repudiation of the traditional characters still utilized in Taiwan, 
Macao, Hong Kong, and other regions under CCP control. While some would argue that 
CIs offer a mere introduction to Chinese and “traditional” or “ancient” Chinese characters 
would not be included anyway, Churchman believes it is fundamentally counterintuitive 
to begin language instruction with only one official, PRC-approved language textbook. 
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 The language taught within CI classrooms, known as Confucius Classrooms, is, 
according to the Tenth Principle of the CI Constitution and By-Laws, labeled as 
“Standard Chinese,” which is most commonly known as Chinese Mandarin or Putonghua 
(普通话).143 As Churchman describes, “This Tenth Principle is…explicit evidence for the 
exclusion of certain subjects from the teaching syllabus of Confucius Institutes.”144 Based 
on Churchman’s argument, the greatest task entrusted to CI educators leads to its greatest 
failure: the promotion of semi-literacy in Chinese. Not only is this a disservice to the 
students who wish to learn Chinese, but also the exclusive instruction of the PRC-
mandated language, which is inherently manipulated and constricting, is a flagrant 
violation of academic integrity. As Churchman observes, “Chinese literacy restricted to 
simplified characters still only constitutes semi-literacy in Chinese.”145 Furthermore, he 
asserts: 
Chinese languages are far more rich and diverse than the single version 
taught by Hanban…and tested in the HSK (Hanyu Shuiping Kaoshi 漢語
水平考試 / 汉语水平考试). Non-Chinese speakers should have the 
chance to learn as many and varied versions of Chinese and Chinese 
languages as possible and not be limited by the restrictive language policy 
current in China.146 
 
 Even though CIs are designed to simply introduce simplified Chinese, Churchman 
contends that the omission of traditional characters and the fact that Hanban must 
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approve of the characters being used in primary and secondary schools through 
Confucius Classrooms constitutes a violation of academic freedom. Notably, while 
numerous textbooks used around the world require the approval of a governmental entity 
before classroom instruction, it is striking that even a budding Sinologist would not be 
able to study non-Hanban-approved characters under the auspices of their CI teacher. 
 In addition to this analysis, on March 4, 2012, D.D. Guttenplan wrote an article in 
The New York Times titled “Critics Worry About Influence of Chinese Institutes on U.S. 
Campuses.” The most revealing evidence from this article is from June Teufel Dreyer, 
who teaches Chinese government and foreign policy at the University of Miami and 
demonstrates the suppression of free speech of CI educators. “‘You’re told not to discuss 
the Dalai Lama — or to invite the Dalai Lama to campus. Tibet, Taiwan, China’s military 
buildup, factional fights inside the Chinese leadership — these are all off limits.’”147 The 
implications for this message are twofold: academics would not be able to interact with 
CI educators to ask pressing questions about their home country, and young students in 
Confucius Classrooms would not be able to learn about the China that contradicts the one 
presented to them. While the latter scenario is less likely than the former, this caliber of 
classroom censorship is indicative of the greater issue of academic freedom playing 
second fiddle to state propaganda. 
 Some have even criticized CIs during congressional testimonies. On March 28, 
2012, Steven W. Mosher, an American social scientist who specializes in human rights in 
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China, testified to the U.S. Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations under the 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs concerning CIs. His testimony, titled “Confucius 
Institutes: Trojan Horses with Chinese Characteristics,” presented that Chinese language 
teaching “leaves out a number of purposes both salient and sinister, namely, sanitizing 
China’s image abroad, enhancing its ‘soft power’ globally, and creating a new generation 
of China watchers who [are] well-disposed towards the Communist dictatorship.”148 
Mosher focuses on the fact that Hanban is directly connected with the United Front Work 
Department, which he says was designed to practice “subversion, cooption and control” 
of political parties outside of the CCP. 149 This indicates that “one of the chief purposes of 
the Confucius Institutes are, namely, to subvert, coopt, and ultimately control Western 
academic discourse on matters pertaining to China.”150 
 Mosher explores elements of CIs that have generated great controversy such as 
“allegations of Confucius Institutes undermining academic freedom at host universities, 
engaging in industrial and military espionage, monitoring the activities of Chinese 
students abroad, and attempting to advance the Chinese Party-State’s political agenda on 
such issues as the Dalai Lama and Tibet, Taiwan independence, the pro-democracy 
movement abroad, and dissent within China itself.”151 Mosher also devotes a portion of 
his testimony to address the recruitment of CI teachers, who are “carefully vetted for 
ideological purity before being assigned to indoctrinate young Americans in a ‘correct,’ 
                                                 






which is to say positive, understanding of the Chinese Party-State and its growing role in 
the world.”152 Here, as stated previously, Hanban’s stipulations to become a CI educator 
is again emblematic of an egregious violation of human rights. As Mosher describes, 
“Such discrimination against Falun Gong and, presumable, others who have tried to 
exercise their rights to freedom of conscience, assembly, speech, and association violates 
anti-discrimination laws and international standards of human rights.”153 
 He also incorporates into his testimony the perspective of Fabrice De Pierrebourg, 
a French investigative journalist, and Michel Juneau-Katsuya, a former senior 
intelligence officer and manager at the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. According 
to both, “a number of individuals holding positions within the Confucius Institute system 
have backgrounds in Chinese security agencies and the United Front Work Department. 
Together, these agencies are responsible for a number of activities in foreign countries, 
including propaganda, the monitoring and control of Chinese students abroad, the 
recruiting of agents among the Overseas Chinese diaspora and sympathetic foreigners, 
and long-term clandestine operations.”154 
 To conclude his remarks, Mosher explains that some foreign governments have 
responded to CIs differently than the U.S. As he describes, outside of the U.S. and 
Canada, both India and Japan have also seen CIs appear at their universities. According 
to domain-b.com, India’s first online business magazine, the Indian Ministry of External 
Affairs opposed the establishment of CIs at Indian universities three years before this 






testimony, arguing that the “Indian government suspects that this is a Chinese design to 
spread its ‘soft power’ - widening influence by using culture as a propagational tool.”155 
Concerning Japan, Mosher states, “The Japanese government has serious reservations as 
well. It is telling that of 20 or so CIs that Hanban has been able to set up in Japan, all 
were at private colleges.”156 In his final statement to the Subcommittee, Mosher returns to 
U.S. interests and invokes the stark political, economic, and social differences between 
the U.S. and China as a reason to not allow entities like CIs to educate American youth. 
“Given that the Chinese Party-State does not share our democratic institutions, nor our 
commitment to open markets, nor our understanding of human rights, their purposes are 
antithetical to ours. Should we really be allowing a cruel, tyrannical and repressive 
regime to educate our young people?”157 
 One Canadian university decided that it could no longer allow this on its campus. 
On February 7, 2013, McMaster University terminated its CI agreement after an instance 
of discriminatory hiring.158 The impetus for this termination was because Sonia Zhao, a 
CI teacher at McMaster University and a Falun Gong practitioner, filed a human rights 
complaint against the university. Prior to becoming a CI teacher, she was required to sign 
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a statement promising not to practice Falun Gong.159 After her time at McMaster 
University, she made a complaint against the university to the Ontario Human Rights 
Tribunal based on the university condoning discriminatory hiring practices preventing her 
from practicing her religion. After McMaster University determined it did not want to be 
affiliated with discriminatory hiring, it ceased further operation with Hanban. This 
instance served as an example for other universities considering opening a CI. 
Referencing this incident, Terry Russell, the director of Asian studies at the University of 
Manitoba, who opposed opening a CI at his university, stated that CIs “have no particular 
interest in what we would consider critical enquiry or academic freedom.”160 
 Following this episode, one of the most critical analyses of CIs emerged on 
October 30, 2013, when anthropology professor Marshall Sahlins published a scathing 
rebuke of the CI at his University of Chicago in an article in The Nation titled “China U.” 
Beginning with an objective description much like other scholars and those critical of 
CIs, Sahlins defines a CI as “an academic unit that provides accredited instruction in 
Chinese language and culture and sponsors a variety of extracurricular activities, 
including art exhibitions, lectures, conferences, film screenings and celebrations of 
Chinese festivals.”161 Also like other scholars and those critical of CIs, however, Sahlins 
follows this description by criticizing Hanban as “an instrument of the party state 
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operating as an international pedagogical organization” and ridicules the clandestine 
procedures that surround CI contracts.162 
 Sahlins is highly critical of the clause within the CI Constitution and By-Laws 
that stipulates that all CI activities “conform to the customs, laws and regulations of 
China as well as those of the host institution’s country.”163 Believing such a clause to be 
paradoxical, Sahlins questions how this would function at U.S. institutions of higher 
learning. “Hanban operates under Chinese laws that criminalize forms of political speech 
and systems of belief that are protected in the United States by the First Amendment, 
making it likely that…American universities would be complicit in discriminatory hiring 
or violations of freedom of speech.”164 Moreover, “because the constitution of the 
Confucius Institutes stipulates that it and its bylaws are ‘applicable to all Confucius 
Institutes,’ the officers of host universities must accept the Chinese control of academic 
work in their institutions and agree to keep this arrangement secret. Is this even legal?”165 
 Much like Dreyer, Sahlins has a similar view and observes that several topics are 
off-limits for CI educators. This includes the “Tiananmen massacre, blacklisted authors, 
human rights, the jailing of dissidents, the democracy movement, currency manipulation, 
environmental pollution and the Uighur autonomy movement in Xinjiang.”166 In a plea 
for a upholding a higher standard of academic freedom, Sahlins urges CI host universities 








to reverse their course and stand for collective academic interests over pecuniary and 
individual benefit: “[By] hosting a Confucius Institute, [universities] have become 
engaged in the political and propaganda efforts of a foreign government in a way that 
contradicts the values of free inquiry and human welfare to which they are otherwise 
committed.”167 Sahlins reinforces this article with his 2015 publication titled Confucius 
Institutes: Academic Malware. In this publication, he combines the arguments made in 
“China U.” with public media reports and communications with individuals who either 
have a role with CIs or those who have encountered CIs to demonstrate that CIs are not 
politically-uninterested, non-profit organizations, but instead catalysts for academic 
malpractice and violators of academic integrity.168 
 Following these events and a growing number of criticism, two influential 
organizations that represent faculty members of institutions of higher learning in their 
respective states, the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) and the 
Canadian Association of University Teachers (CAUT), voiced concern over CIs. In the 
2014 statement, titled “On Partnerships with Foreign Governments: The Case of 
Confucius Institutes,” the AAUP joins the CAUT in their 2013 statement and “[calls] on 
all universities currently hosting Confucius Institutes to cease doing so.”169 As the AAUP 
elaborates: 
Globalization has...meant that university administrators have welcomed 
involvement of foreign governments, corporations, foundations, and 
donors on campuses in North America. These relationships have often 
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been beneficial. But university administrations have entered into 
partnerships that sacrificed the integrity of the university and its academic 
staff. Exemplifying the latter are Confucius Institutes…[which] function 
as an arm of the Chinese state and are allowed to ignore academic 
freedom. Their academic activities are under the supervision of Hanban, a 
Chinese state agency which is chaired by a member of the Politburo and 
the vice-premier of the People’s Republic of China. Most agreements 
establishing Confucius Institutes feature nondisclosure clauses and 
unacceptable concessions to the political aims and practices of the 
government of China. Specifically, North American universities permit 
Confucius Institutes to advance a state agenda in the recruitment and 
control of academic staff, in the choice of curriculum, and in the 
restriction of debate.170 
 
 Acknowledging the existence of the British Council, Goethe-Institut, and 
L’Alliance Franςaise along with their connections with imperialist pasts, ongoing 
geopolitical strategies, and “soft power” objectives, the AAUP and CAUT joined 
together in drawing the largest distinction between these entities and CIs. “None of them 
are located on a university or college campus. Instead, their connection to national 
political agendas and interests require that they be established where they can fulfill their 
mandates openly without threatening the independence and integrity of academic 
institutions in host countries.”171 Moreover, both representative bodies send a resounding, 
unified message to the PRC: “Allowing any third-party control of academic matters is 
inconsistent with principles of academic freedom, shared governance, and the 
institutional autonomy of colleges and universities.”172 
 Finally, the AAUP offers three recommendations on precisely how CIs could be 
compatible with the mission of the academic institution. Stating that “universities 






[should] cease their involvement in Confucius Institutes unless the agreement between 
the university and Hanban is renegotiated,”173 both organizations demand the following 
concessions. Firstly, the university must have “unilateral control, consistent with 
principles articulated in the AAUP’s Statement on Government of Colleges and 
Universities, over all academic matters, including recruitment of teachers, determination 
of curriculum, and choice of texts.”174 Secondly, the university must afford “Confucius 
Institute teachers the same academic freedom rights, as defined in the 1940 Statement of 
Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, that it affords all other faculty in the 
university.”175 Lastly, “the university-Hanban agreement [must be] made available to all 
members of the university community.”176 Clearly, the current terms of agreement 
between universities and Hanban are not acceptable among those who are ultimately 
entrusted with carrying out the academic mission of the institution. 
 National university faculty representation is not the only issue on which the U.S. 
and Canada share concern over CIs. During his remarks at the University of Utah on 
September 19, 2014, David Matas utilized horrific images of brutal repression and organ 
harvesting of members of the Falun Gong to implore the University of Utah to “close its 
Confucius Institute.”177 Matas bolstered this request by recounting the history of 
McMaster University’s removal of its CI. Matas stated that, because the University of 
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Utah has an Equal Opportunity and Nondiscrimination Employment policy, if they 
investigate they will find that a “Confucius Institute functions in violation of the policy 
by discriminating in hiring against Falun Gong as McMaster University has done. The 
University should not maintain the Institute in violation of that policy.”178 Indeed, much 
like McMaster University harboring an institution that takes orders from the Chinese 
government, the University of Utah is complicit in discriminatory hiring. The same is 
true for all American universities that have a CI. 
 Seemingly heeding Matas’ advice, the end of 2014 included two American 
universities, the University of Chicago and Pennsylvania State University, that severed 
ties with their CI. After a petition circulated among faculty raised concerns that “in 
hosting the Chinese government-funded center for research and language teaching, 
Chicago was ceding control over faculty hiring, course content, and programming to 
Confucius Institute headquarters in Beijing,” the University of Chicago refused to 
negotiate another agreement with Hanban, effectively removing the CI from its campus 
on September 25, 2014.179 In the official statement from the University of Chicago, 
members of the academic community pledged their support to academic freedom over a 
partnership with the PRC. “The University of Chicago remains committed to supporting 
the strong connections and longstanding collaborations between University of Chicago 
faculty and students and Chinese scholars, students, and institutions. As always, the 
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University is guided by its core values and faculty leadership in all matters of academic 
importance.”180 
 Pennsylvaia State University became the second prominent instance of an 
American university removing its CI. Only one week after the announcement at the 
University of Chicago, Dean Susan Welch of the College of the Liberal Arts issued a 
statement (first reported by Inside Higher Ed) that “‘several of our goals are not 
consistent with those of the Office of Chinese Languages Council International, known as 
the Hanban, which provides support to Confucius Institutes throughout the world.’”181 
One area of concern was that the Penn State Asian Studies department “‘had more 
ambitious ideas for the ways CI funding could be used’” such as “‘research not only in 
the humanities or on Chinese culture, but also on science, politics, the environment, and a 
variety of other topics,’”182 which Hanban purportedly failed to accept.183 These concerns 
also extended to dissatisfaction over the use of Hanban pedagogical materials and 
propaganda-like nature of CI cultural programming.184 
 Outside of the realm of academia, there also exists domestic concerns about CIs. 
On September 1, 2014, Peng Xiaohua published an article on the “Shared Knowledge 
Network” in which she criticizes CIs from a domestic perspective. In this article, 
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translated on the European Association for Chinese Studies website, she writes, “When 
the government spends large sums of taxpayer money, gathered up by people saving on 
clothing and eating sparingly, on building up the image of the country and spread 
[Chinese] culture, build up soft power, if they fail, then so be it, but here they were 
spending large sums of money achieving the opposite result, a negative result, taking 
their ways of doing things at home with them abroad….”185 She also criticizes the RPC 
for prioritizing Chinese language learning of native speakers rather than helping rural 
youth in access to an adequate education.186 
 Criticisms and concerns over CIs also transcend ideological or political affiliation. 
In February 2015, the conservative think tank The Heritage Foundation published a 
report titled “China’s Public Opinion Warfare: How Our Culture Industry Learned to 
Stop Worrying and Love the PRC,” which lambasts CIs as Trojan Horses for PRC 
influence in American universities. The author, Mike Gonzalez, a Senior Fellow with the 
Heritage Foundation blames CIs for promoting propaganda through U.S. academia and 
writes, “Efforts to influence, if not corrupt, our culture-making industries and indoctrinate 
the American people in a favorable view of the PRC regime may pose a threat to our 
long-term national security.”187 Rather than just focusing on how CIs at American 
universities are strongholds of industrial espionage, absent of informed debate, and 
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designed to avoid transparency, Gonzalez believes that CIs are emblematic of a greater 
plot of Chinese propaganda in the West that also pervades the film industry. 188  
 In films such as The Mummy: Tomb of the Dragon Emperor, the newly-adapted 
version of The Karate Kid, World War Z, and Red Dawn before they can be screened in 
China — if they are even screened at all — they must be vetted by Chinese censors to 
ensure that the film reflects a positive view of China.189 Of course, much like universities 
in dire need of adequate funding after years of state cuts to higher education, film 
directors will abandon freedom of creative art in order to attract the enormous Chinese 
audience for financial gain. In other words, profit eclipses principle, which is the same 
reason market-driven universities jump at Chinese funding.190 It is no surprise that CIs 
emulate this broader behavior by the Chinese government. In a final word on CIs at 
American universities, Gonzalez states, “The evidence is ample that this association is 
questionable at best and may pose national security risks,” and “when universities do not 
stay true to their core mission of the free pursuit of facts, they indoctrinate rather than 
educate.”191 
Most recently, on April 26, 2017, Rachelle Peterson with the National Association 
of Scholars (NAS) called on “all universities [to] close their Confucius Institutes.”192 The 
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NAS is perceived in higher education as a conservative-leaning organization. 193 
According to Peterson, “Confucius Institutes permit an agency of a foreign government 
to have access to university courses, and on principle that is a university function. 
Institutions should have full control over who they hire, over what they teach, and 
Confucius Institutes basically act like class-in-a-box kits that come ready-made for 
universities to use.” 194 Citing numerous concerns outlined in this thesis in addition to 
anecdotal evidence from CI teachers, Peterson recommends to universities to either 
remove their CI or institute oversight provisions to protect academic integrity.  
These provisions include the disclosure of all contracts and agreements between 
Hanban and the host institution, requirement of separate budgets between the host 
institution and CI, have universities select CI teachers, ensure legal disputes are handled 
in the host country rather than in China, require CI teacher orientation on matters related 
to academic freedom, and require a public lecture course about contemporary issues that 
are often neglected, such as the Tiananmen Square protests. 195 Furthermore, the report 
recommends that “state and federal legislative bodies exercise oversight.” 196 This 
includes a formal investigation of CIs by Congress to evaluate national security concerns 
and the potential of CIs to “monitor, intimidate, and harass Chinese students,”197 
hampering their ability to enjoy U.S. standards of academic freedom. 
                                                 













 As these examples show, it is evident that criticism of CIs and their violations of 
academic freedom are not limited to one region of the world or to one ideological 
framework. Numerous scholars of various nationalities and backgrounds have identified 
that CIs jeopardize academic freedom and are clearly representative of Chinese 
propaganda. 
CIs violate basic standards of academic freedom, a tenet of academia that should be 
protected as a human right. The previous sections show how CIs are integral to Chinese 
public diplomacy through analysis by a neutral observer, how the strict governance 
structure and regulations undermine individual autonomy of CIs, how CI executive 
leadership undermines their reputation, and the numerous criticisms from scholars of 
various nationalities, backgrounds, and ideological affiliations. Collectively, the evidence 
and concerns reveal that CIs are a threat to academic freedom. However, universities 
around the world are jumping at the opportunity to be the home to a CI and demonstrate 
their commitment to taking advantage of globalization and connection to the world’s 
second-largest economy and a rising superpower. This thesis argues that, in order to 
protect academic freedom, universities must terminate their agreements with Hanban or 
implement commonsense oversight provisions outlined in the AAUP statement: the 
university must maintain control over all academic matters, including choices of text and 
teacher selection, the CI must affirm the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic 
Freedom and Tenure, and the university-Hanban agreement must be a public document 
accessible to all members of the academic community. Despite these logical requests, one 









Western Kentucky University (WKU) is a comprehensive, public university in the 
Commonwealth of Kentucky that harbors a diverse student, faculty, and staff population. 
The state’s third-largest university, WKU “encourages engaged research and public 
service in support of economic development, quality of life, and improvement of 
education at all levels. WKU faculty contribute to the identification and solution of key 
social, economic, scientific, health, and environmental problems.”198 WKU is also the 
home of Kentucky’s first Confucius Institute (CI). 
Not to be confused with the U.S. Department of Defense-sponsored Chinese 
Language Flagship Program, the WKU CI was established in April 2010. Customary of 
the CI joint-venture structure, the WKU CI is partnered with North China Electric Power 
University (华北电力大学).199 The official WKU CI website describes its activities as 
being “aimed at disseminating the Chinese culture and language throughout the state of 
Kentucky.”200 In addition, the WKU CI “recruits Chinese teachers from China, and 
strategically places the Chinese teachers in K-12 institutions throughout the state, 
offering Chinese language and culture classes.”201 Moreover, the WKU CI “serves as a 
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regional center for Chinese teacher training, and Chinese curriculum development at the 
K-12 level. The CI at WKU is a conduit for Chinese language and culture 
programming.”202 The WKU CI website also boasts a description of Hanban as “[going] 
all out in meeting the demands of foreign Chinese learners and contributing to the 
development of multiculturalism and the building of a harmonious world.”203  
 In a video titled “WKU CI Overview,” WKU president Gary Ransdell narrates the 
achievements of the WKU CI since its inception and how its presence at WKU has 
expanded to local communities across Kentucky. Ransdell recounts how after he visited 
the CI Headquarters in Beijing, he wanted students to experience China at WKU every 
time they walk through the library.204 During a cultural performance hosted by the WKU 
CI, Ransdell remarked, “Nothing represents WKU’s international reach more than our 
partnership with the Chinese Ministry of Education to host Kentucky’s first Confucius 
Institute on the campus of Western Kentucky University.”205 Following Ransdell was 
former secretary of labor Elaine Chao206 — a Taiwanese American. “America and China 
are part of an increasingly interconnected and diverse world. America is the world’s 
largest developed country and China is the world’s largest developing country, and this 
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relationship is among the most important bilateral relationships in the world. And our 
contact and interactions with one another will only accelerate in the years to come.”207 
 The video tells the emotional stories of CI teachers leaving their families in China 
behind to help young Kentuckians learn Mandarin Chinese through Confucius 
Classrooms, the opportunities the CI affords young students to travel to China, and a RV-
turned-Chinese mobile unit to take “The Chinese Cultural Experience” across 
Kentucky.208 The WKU CI also introduces to students who grew up in rural, 
predominately white communities a culture vastly different from their own. One student 
from Barren County High School, because of the influence of the WKU CI, remarked 
about CI programming, “I hope that one day when I have children I will be able to teach 
them to be open to other cultures and not to stay in just one culture.”209 The video also 
announces that the WKU CI was “honored with the 2013 CI of the Year Award at the 
eighth annual global CI conference in Beijing.”210 Moreover, Xu Lin, who is featured in 
the video, praised Ransdell and called WKU, due to its commitment to expanding its CI, 
a “very good university.”211 She received an honorary degree from WKU in 2011. 
 Yet, despite the grandiose language and celebration of U.S.-China unity through a 
comprehensive university in Kentucky, the video does not include the intense scrutiny by 
members of the campus community concerning the WKU CI’s lack of transparency, 








unethical practices, and influence over university policy. Indeed, in many ways, the 
WKU CI is a labyrinthian puzzle, and each controversy surrounding the WKU CI 
jeopardizes WKU’s commitment to higher learning as a “leading American university” 
committed to academic freedom. 
 In 2010, Hanban News announced that the person of contact for the WKU CI 
would be Pan Weiping (潘伟平)212, a position he still holds as of the spring 2017 
semester. The governance of the WKU CI consists of Dr. Pan Weiping, Assistant to the 
President & Sumpter Emeritus Professor of Chemistry for the Institute for Combustion 
Science and Environmental Technology (ICSET), Terrill Martin, the WKU CI Managing 
Director and Operations Manager for the ICSET, and Guan Chunmei, WKU CI Associate 
Director of Educational Outreach. Notably, Pan and Martin work for both the WKU CI 
and ICSET, an inherent conflict of interest. The union between these two sectors of WKU 
will eventually result in an unprecedented fifty-year partnership between WKU and the 
Chinese government. 
 Concerns about the WKU CI by members of the campus community are often 
dismissed by WKU CI officials and administrators since it is not directly involved in 
academic research, but, instead, only involved with teaching K-12 students a basic 
introduction to Chinese. As stated in the BBC article, “Western defenders of Confucius 
Institutes argue that they are primarily language training centres, so there is little room 
                                                 




for Beijing to use them to brainwash foreign students.”213 It is telling the WKU President 
Gary Ransdell remarked to the College Heights Herald, the WKU student newspaper, 
that the WKU CI is solely a language-training center by stating that CI teachers are “‘not 
directly involved in the curriculum.’”214 As reported by the College Heights Herald, 
“Ransdell said he doesn't expect the…program to generate similar controversy as at 
University of Chicago and University of Pennsylvania State. Both schools terminated 
their Confucius Institutes within the last year due to faculty restrictions on 
curriculum.”215 While these comments are likely directed to university students using CI 
educators as resources to conduct research on East Asia, they also make the false 
assumption that language instruction with Chinese-mandated textbooks is somehow 
divorced from curriculum. 
 In American higher education, public universities face almost-perennial budget 
reductions and lack of commitment from lawmakers to postsecondary opportunities, and 
Kentucky is no exception. In this environment, American universities tend to jump at 
funding, regardless of if the strings attached are connected to an authoritarian regime with 
very little respect for academic freedom. According to Marshall Sahlins in The Nation: 
Another reason Hanban is willing to accommodate some American 
universities is that their interests are different in scale and character. As an 
instrument of the Chinese government, Hanban wants to spread the 
influence of the Chinese state worldwide, particularly in strategically 
consequential regions, and above all in the United States. The apparent 
loss Hanban suffers by making a concession may be a long-term gain for a 
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global program. By contrast, American universities are concerned only 
with their parochial welfare as academic institutions. They are thus 
inclined to ignore or dismiss the unsavory political aspects of Confucius 
Institutes—which is to say, the larger implications of their own 
participation—so long as they get a good deal. Then again, given these 
private interests, American universities have other good reasons for 
refraining from objecting to the CI program. Directly or indirectly, but 
ever-increasingly, American institutions of higher learning are heavily 
dependent on Chinese money.216 
 
 In this case, WKU is a prime example of an institution willing to forfeit academic 
freedom and institutional integrity for funding. As Ransdell stated to the Bowling Green 
Daily News on September 10, 2016, “‘There’s nothing that we know of with the Chinese 
education ministry and Hanban that suggests any scaling back of their commitment,’ he 
said. ‘So as long as they're willing to fund us, we’re willing to provide these services.’”217 
If the Kentucky state government continues to reduce funding to institutions of higher 
learning and prioritizing workforce development over a liberal arts education, will the 
eventual outcome be that undergraduate teaching authority be delegated to outside groups 
with the money for such endeavors? It is possible that instruction concerning topics in 
Asia and China will be delegated to CI teachers, which should alarm any supporter of 
academic freedom. 
 In this same article by the Bowling Green Daily News, Aaron Mudd reported that 
reputable universities like the University of Chicago and Pennsylvania State University 
have removed their CIs due to concerns over their violation of academic freedom. In 
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response, Ransdell said, “the problem at those two universities was that the Confucius 
Institute became too involved in curriculum. That hasn’t been a problem for WKU.”218 
Concerning Hanban interference with academic programming, “‘The issue on a very few 
campuses has been shaped by an over-engagement of the CI in the curriculum and that – 
in my opinion – is a mistake. You don’t want another government involved in your 
curriculum. You don’t want it to be an academic program.’”219 Admitting that 
involvement by a foreign government to stifle debate and influence American academia 
is a programmatic overreach, it stands to reason that the WKU CI has no influence on 
university curriculum. However, according to Dr. Jeffrey Samuels, WKU professor of 
Asian religions and cultures, CIs inherently jeopardize the university’s academic mission. 
Samuels recalls his attempt to bring a Tibetan monk to WKU to showcase Tibetan 
dance as religious practice, but the CI could not support such a blatant disrespect of their 
interpretation of Chinese traditions.220 Furthermore, Samuels believes that the WKU CI 
“could be fraught with conflicting values between the institution and the Chinese 
government. Whereas American universities hold academic freedom as sacrosanct, the 
Chinese government doesn’t.”221 This instance shows that despite the preference of an 
East Asian studies professor to demonstrate to students genuine Tibetan culture, the 
WKU CI did not believe in or endorse this interpretation of “real” China. Instead, they 
objected to this request and halted it in its tracks, showing that the Chinese government 







has the power to control the conversation on China at WKU and that they clearly exercise 
it. Regardless, these violations of academic freedom are guaranteed to exist at WKU for 
the next fifty years. 
 
The Fifty-Year Deal 
 
On January 23, 2015, WKU President Gary Ransdell introduced to the university 
Board of Regents a proposition to approve the “Confucius Institute Design/Build 
Project.”222 This project essentially combined awarded funds by Hanban and designated 
funds through the university to create a building on WKU’s Bowling Green campus that 
would be used mainly for CI teachers. Ransdell sold this to the Board as an award from 
Hanban after being in “heated competition with the other 99 CIs across America to get 
one of these buildings.”223 He specified that Hanban would commit $1.5 million in 
constructing this building and the university would need to match that amount. His 
recommendation was to use $700,000.00 in in-kind donations and $800,000.00 from 
reserve funding from ICSET, a coal chemistry lab that has no relation to Chinese 
language instruction. It is, however, the sector of campus that employs both Dr. Pan 
Weiping and Terrill Martin. 
 In describing the building, Ransdell indicated that there would be “two 
classrooms, two kind of flex spaces, four offices, a copy center, five offices, excuse me, 
one on the first floor and four on the second floor, and a modest little kitchen, where I 
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assume our Chinese teachers will most likely cook stuff.”224 Coupled with this anodyne 
description of the building, the president also insisted that academic freedom remains a 
top priority of WKU: “We try to keep some distance with our Confucius Institute and 
direct engagement of our curriculum because we do not want to do anything that would 
involve our Chinese friends in anything related to academic freedom or anything of that 
nature.”225 
 Opening the floor for discussion, Regent Phillip Bale remarked that having such a 
building would, perhaps, increase enrollment by Chinese students, who comprise WKU’s 
third-largest international group.226 Regent Gillard Johnson questioned if there would be 
a contract or agreement, signifying that the Board was not aware of any type of 
contractual obligation. The faculty regent, Barbara Burch, harboring many concerns 
about such a building, expressed that such a building was not necessary and argued that 
she “really struggle[d] with the Chinese Teacher Training Institute that is not connected 
to our academics. They are not in the teacher training business.”227 Another regent, John 
Ridley, indicating caution with a university, financial partnership with a foreign 
government, remarked, “What if politically, geopolitically something took place with the 
Chinese government and the relationships with the United States?”228 After assuaging 








Ridley’s concerns by saying WKU will keep the building if Hanban withdraws from the 
deal, Ransdell pivoted to say: 
There is one caution. I want to be careful to keep this a program and not 
part of our actual curriculum because I don’t think we want to be involved 
with the Chinese government in matters that relate to our curriculum per 
say. Institutions have gotten crossways with their faculty in that regard and 
I don’t ever want our Chinese relations to be an issue with anything that 
we relate to academic freedom or anything of that nature. I tell our 
students, and our faculty, every chance I get: you don’t have to condone a 
country’s politics to understand its culture and embrace its people and 
understand the value of trade. Those three things that our CI is mostly 
about [sic]: understanding culture, language, and trade. Let other people 
deal with the politics and governmental policies.229 
  
While this statement seems to support separation of university curriculum and PRC 
policies, CIs are intrinsically tied to the Chinese government’s views of culture, which 
includes overlooking numerous human rights abuses and no protection of academic 
freedom. While in the realm of international relations it is necessary for governments 
with conflicting views to cooperate, CIs enable the Chinese government to control the 
conversation on the PRC at an institution of higher learning, the very antithesis of 
academic freedom. After the final vote of nine in favor, one against (Faculty Regent 
Burch), and one abstention, the WKU Board of Regents approved the partnership. A few 
months later, members of the campus community became privy to the stipulations 
outlined in the contract when it became available because of an open records request. As 
it turns out, Ransdell failed to mention some of the contract’s key provisions, most 
notably its non-disclosure clause and its duration of fifty years.  




 The CI contract, dated December 18, 2014, explicitly states the following: 
according to Article 35, “Both parties shall treat this as a confidential file,” implying that 
any third party should be excluded from viewings its provisions and, according to Article 
21, “the Dedicated Site…shall be subject to the free and exclusive use of the Model 
Confucius Institute for 50 years…and that during this period the University shall not 
change the functions of the Dedicated Site.”230 This and other provisions of the contract 
make it clear that this new building was not only intended to house the WKU CI, but it 
was also designed exclusively as a Chinese government foothold on a college campus. 
 As the WKU student body president and student regent at the time that the 
contract provisions became public (but not when the Board approved the contract231), 
many people shared their concerns with me about what this meant for the university in 
the long-term. After I raised concerns in the local press about the contents of the contract 
and how it would affect WKU, I was contacted by Padma Dolma, the Europe and 
Campaigns Director for Students for a Free Tibet. Dolma stated: 
I can see…that you have exactly the same concerns regarding their 
contracts and secret decision-making as us…We have successfully helped 
to cancel two Confucius Institute deals, last year in Toronto and this year 
Stuttgart, Germany… [and] I will be able to also share the in-depth 
research that we have undertaken over the past 12 months regarding the 
Confucius Institutes as we have been in touch with academic staff, 
students worldwide who are concerned about the threat that CIs pose to 
academic freedom.232 
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 I was also contacted by Joel Chip, a Canadian who worked to stop the CI at the 
Toronto District School Board. He explained to me that he felt “it of utmost importance 
to stop CI from entering WKU.”233 In the email, he explained that the “chair of the TDSB 
brought the CI in and discreetly signed the contract to have CI open in Sept 2015. When 
we brought attention of the controversies surrounding CI to all the board trustees they 
voted unanimously to cancel it. They were furious how the chair did not bring these 
issues to light.”234 He lambasted CIs as “a political tool by the regime under the disguise 
of a ‘cultural and language program,’” an entity that “censors information and 
disseminates communist propaganda in their textbooks and learning materials that are 
used by students,” and a mechanism by which the PRC can “censor academic freedoms 
to protect the image of the communist party.”235  
 He also included an explanation of why McMaster University terminated their CI. 
According to Chip, the university was taken to the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario 
because  
CI discriminated in their hiring practices against one of their teachers who 
came from China. The teacher practiced Falun Gong, the spiritual faith 
that is being unjustly persecuted by the Chinese regime. Lawyers found 
that the teacher was forced to sign a contract in China stating that she 
would not practice any religion including Falun Gong while overseas. 
However, the signing of the contract and discrimination in China did not 
make a difference because CI was operating under the umbrella of 
McMaster, so McMaster had to take responsibility for the 
discrimination.236 
                                                 







 Although such discrimination violated the university’s anti-discrimination 
policies, McMaster was held accountable for this discriminatory behavior, thus resulting 
in the university removing its CI. Chip concluded his email by stating, “Regardless of 
how much money is involved WKU has the responsibility to uphold democracy and 
academic freedom,” and encouraged me not to be “blind to the fact that nothing is free 
and that the Chinese communist regime has massive ulterior motives for setting up CI on 
your campus and giving you money.’”237 
 The response within the WKU community was no less critical. In an opinion 
editorial on September 14, 2015, titled “SGA tables resolution that asks Ransdell to 
revisit $1.5 million Hanban contract,”238 the College Heights Herald depicts the Board 
meeting at which Ransdell introduced the CI building, calling it the “Confusion Institute” 
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and portraying an anonymous regent stating they would approve it because “it’s all 
Chinese” to them.239  
Moreover, their stance is made explicit: “The approval to sign this contract by the 
Board of Regents without receiving a copy of it seems ill-considered and premature.”240 
After recounting the discussion during the January board meeting, the student newspaper 
closes with “Through this contract with Hanban, Ransdell is giving a foreign agency a 
means to control part of the university’s functions. Granting an outside force the ability to 
make decisions at the university level, even if only for one building, seems risky and 
irresponsible.”241 




Figure 3. Cartoon depicting Western Kentucky University Board of Regents 
Meeting on January 23, 2015, (cartoon is mislabeled) where President Gary 
Ransdell requested approval of the WKU Model Confucius Institute Building. 
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 With growing concerns about the implications of the Chinese government being 
present on a university campus for fifty years, members of the campus community 
requested the Board of Regents reconsider approval of the contract. On August 17, 2015, 
the Senate Executive Committee (SEC), the executive arm of the University Senate, the 
governing body for all faculty members at WKU, unanimously approved a motion to 
submit the following statement for a vote at the next University Senate meeting on 
August 27: 
The WKU Senate Executive Committee strongly believes that the 
Confucius Institute building contract signed by President Gary Ransdell is 
not in the best interest of Western Kentucky University. For that reason, 
the WKU Senate Executive Committee asks that Faculty Regent Barbara 
Burch suggest to President Ransdell, and to the Board of Regents if 
needed, that the contract be revisited and no contractual obligations be 
undertaken until that time.242 
 
On August 27, 2015, the University Senate voted unanimously in favor of the motion. 
One month later on September 22, 2015, the WKU Student Government Association 
(SGA) passed Resolution 2-15-F, a “Resolution to Disapprove of the Procedure by which 
the Model Confucius Institute at Western Kentucky University was Effectuated.”243  
 Ultimately, the Board of Regents, even with unanimous encouragement from 
leaders in the university community to reconsider the contract in light of the new 
evidence presented to them, declined to revisit the contract due to the failure of Board 
executive leadership to bring the matter forward for discussion. In the end, the building 
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was constructed as planned. It even includes a “Chinese Friendship Garden” situated 
between the new building and the recently-constructed Honors College and International 
Center, which was built only months prior. Located on Normal Drive, the WKU CI 
building now stands adjacent to Jody Richards Hall, the center for free speech studies and 
journalism at WKU, where it will remain for fifty years. 
 
A Series of Unfortunate Events 
 
Only two months after the controversy over the CI building, the University Senate 
set their sights on the university’s responsibility to protect intellectual property. This shift 
in focus came after two professors became victims of “state-sponsored espionage”244 
while on a WKU CI-sponsored trip in China. The events that follow are anecdotal stories 
from two professors who have no connection with the CI, but whose intellectual property 
was stolen. 
 In a College Heights Herald article titled “Gone in a Flash,” Andrew Henderson 
recounts the puzzling events that occurred throughout August 2015. “Martha Day, 
SKyTeach education codirector, GSKyTeach executive director and associate professor 
of science education, and Lynn Hines, professional in residence at the School of Teacher 
Education, traveled to China from Aug. 3-7, 2015, to conduct teacher training.”245 This 
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was both professors’ third time traveling to China for this same reason (albeit it was to 
train college educators and not K-12 teachers), meaning that they were not naïve tourists 
who were unprepared for the journey.246 
 While in China, Day had a flash drive stolen, on which she had stored “projects 
related to the Confucius Institute, lesson plans she had taught to Hanban teachers, 
evaluation documents related to Hanban teachers, [and] information pertaining to her 
students and training materials.”247 At 4:17 AM Central Standard Time, Pan Weiping 
received an email from Day stating her flash drive had been compromised: “Day stated 
her flash drive was taken out of her classroom by one of the Hanban personnel. Day said 
this person claimed Day had given her permission, but Day said that was not the case. 
She said when the drive was returned to her, it was loaded with files that were 
corrupt.”248 
 Clearly concerned about her intellectual property, Day immediately reached out to 
Paul Mooney, the WKU Compliance Manager, whose job is to provide guidance and 
support to faculty, staff, and students engaging in research at WKU. In an email response 
to Day, Mooney said “‘Try to keep this on the Down Low, and delete these emails to me. 
I will let you know that if you put up any more of a fuss while there you will be 
questioned more…Try to keep the flash drive on you but do not fight for it. If your 
equipment is corrupt you can get it cleaned I promise. Just be careful.’”249 The article 







delves into all communication between WKU CI officials and members of the 
administration, including Ransdell. “Martin drafted a memorandum to Ransdell on Aug. 
14, 2015, that was also sent to Pan, Evans, Yu, Mooney and Deborah Wilkins, general 
counsel for the university. The memorandum covers various aspects of planning that 
went into the trip, events that transpired, Day and Hines’ budget for their training, two 
appendices and a letter from CTI.”250 
 According to the IT Coordinator at North China Electric Power University 
(NCEPU), whose name is not listed in the article, they “encountered Day in a classroom 
while she was attempting to use her flash drive to open a document on a computer. Day 
was unable to open the document,” and they had told Day that her flash drive had, in fact, 
been infected by a virus.251 After a series of steps, the IT Coordinator said they had 
managed to remove the virus and salvage all original files, “but fake files remained.”252 
Although these statements indicate a willingness of Chinese academic officials to help 
Day, she repudiates this narrative entirely. Instead, Day believes this narrative “holds no 
merit and is false. She said her flash drive was taken out of the room while she was 
distracted, and when it was returned, it contained malware. She also said her flash drive 
still contains the malware.”253  







 When asked about these events, Terrill Martin indicated that he “does not believe 
there was malice on either side and said this was just a misunderstanding.”254 He stated, 
“CTI only conducted and organized the teacher training. It was an NCEPU IT employee 
who was actually involved with the flash drive, Martin said; CTI never took the flash 
drive.”255 After her return to the U.S., Day had given her flash drive to the FBI. 
According to a copy of the FBI report some weeks later, it was clear that the flash drive 
had been infected with a Backdoor:Win32/Bifrose.IZ Trojan virus “that allows 
unauthorized access and control of an affected computer.”256 Finally, according to Brent 
Haselhoff, WKU Manager of Enterprise Security and Identity Management, he stated, 
“because every computer on the internet is technically connected to every other computer 
on the internet, it was a possible [sic] for one computer on the university’s network to 
infect another computer,”257 indicating the potential for such a virus to infect the entire 
WKU shared drive. 
 This was not the end of either professors’ troubles. Besides the stolen intellectual 
property, after their return to the U.S. both professors discovered something very 
troubling about their trip: the WKU CI had lied to them about who provided the training. 
“Day and Hines were told the Hanban/Confucius Institute would be hosting the teacher 
training when in fact they were not.”258 Instead, “they later discovered they were working 








for a for-profit company called Chinese Testing International, which publishes teaching 
materials in China.”259 According to the Chinese Testing International (CTI) website, it is 
“an independent legal entity that specializes in Chinese language testing services.”260 
 Both Day and Hines had indicated multiple times that they were under the 
impression they were working for the CI: “Day said all documents, emails and 
correspondence sent to her and Hines by the WKU Confucius Institute stated that they 
were conducting training for Hanban. Day said she and Hines went through all the 
correspondence the two received and never found a reference to CTI.”261 In fact, in an 
email, Martin had told Day and Hines they “had been selected to teach Hanban teachers 
due to training both had completed previously.”262 Additionally, Martin said “from 
Hanban’s perspective, it’s likely they thought nothing of having another entity affiliated 
with them perform the training and that it might not have been a big deal on their part.”263 
 When Pan was asked about the CTI’s explanation on these events and the 
misunderstanding, he said “‘I wasn’t there, do not know what conversations where [sic], 
and have no perspective on the intentions of the others in attendance.’”264 Martin gave the 
same reply. Ultimately, both professors indicated that had they have known that CTI 
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were involved and Hanban was not presenting all information about the teacher training 
to them accurately, their decision to go would have been drastically different.265 
 On November 19, 2015, the University Senate, prompted by these events and 
what had happened to their colleagues, discussed enhancing the protections for 
intellectual property relating to international travel. At this meeting, Day presented her 
version of this incident. “‘This is a serious matter,’ Day said at the November senate 
meeting. ‘I had four years of my scholarly work stolen from me and a virus installed on 
my flash drive.’”266 Day also stated that she had a formal grievance in process. Although 
grievances almost always flow through the academic hierarchy of department head, dean, 
and provost, because this dealt with the WKU CI, the president of the university would 
have to be involved. As the College Heights Herald explains, “While grievances typically 
go through the Division of Academic Affairs, any grievance filed against an 
administrator within the Confucius Institute would be taken to Ransdell since the 
Confucius Institute reports directly to him.”267 
 The University Senate meeting minutes for November 19, 2015, summarize the 
entire series of events succinctly: 
Martha Day said the issues have not yet been addressed by the 
administration of the university. Flash drives were taken without 
permission and a virus was installed on the flash drive. The Confucius 
Institute misrepresented themselves and were told they would be working 
for Hanban; but they were actually working for a profit agency called CTI. 
Chair Hudepohl clarified that CTI is an arm of Hanban; this was all 
revealed after the fact. They did not work with or hear the acronym CTI 






until after the fact. CTI publishes academic materials all over China. 
Hudepohl stated that she understands self-censorship and the reluctance to 
talk about the Confucius Institute. She thanked Dr. Day for bringing it to 
senate’s attention. Dr. Day then thanked the committees for their work.268 
 
 After this meeting, while additional measures were implemented and forums were 
held concerning protecting one’s intellectual property when studying abroad, the WKU 
CI, once again, got a free pass. Neither punitive action nor public acknowledgement of 
wrongdoing by the CI occurred. Instead, the university president defended the CI 
throughout this process. The final few lines in the College Heights Herald show clearly 
the special relationship between Ransdell and the WKU CI:  
When all is said and done, neither Ransdell, Pan nor Martin believes this 
incident damages the university’s relationship with the Confucius 
Institute. Martin said it’s important to keep things in perspective; 300 
individuals have gone to China through WKU, and this has been the first 
significant issue to come up. Pan echoed the same sentiments almost 
verbatim but at a different time. Ransdell said this incident could have 
happened anywhere — France, Spain, Germany or Ecuador — and rattled 
off a few countries. “I hate that this happened to two distinguished 
members of our faculty, but I don’t see it having any bearing on our WKU 
Confucius Institute,” he said.269 
  
Even after members of the university community voiced concerns about the 
Chinese government’s permanent residency at WKU, misleading professors, and 
jeopardizing intellectual property, it was still not enough to make any CI official or 
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university administrator publicly question that the WKU-Hanban relationship remained 




Far from acknowledging mistakes or wrongdoing, the Western Kentucky University 
2015 Confucius Institute Annual Report provides a summary of the successes of the 
Confucius Institute during its time at WKU. Topics range from its arrangement of 
performance tours, community outreach, and innovative marketing strategies.270 Standing 
in stark contrast to the hopeful tone of this report, however, is one section about CI 
leadership and its communication with members of the academic community. On these 
two pages, a large quotation about CI leadership asserts, “Each position is critical to the 
success of the program, but it is the experience of the CI at WKU that ensures there is 
cohesion between the leadership.”271  
 Near this quotation in smaller font, the report describes how CIs are to effectively 
communicate with members of the campus community. It acknowledges a difference 
between American and Chinese leadership styles: “Chinese operations have clear lines of 
control…where title and defined lines of leadership are clearly defined. The Director 
                                                 





makes all the decisions, whereas, in the U.S. there is a more leadership mentality [sic], 
where everyone has a voice, and relies a bit more on group consensus.”272 
 The report then shifts from acknowledging the differences between U.S. and 
Chinese decision-making styles and pivots to how the CI should deal with negative 
publicity spread by those who are ignorant to the true purpose of CIs: 
Negative publicity can be viewed as the adverse publicity that an 
organization may incur due to a particular reason, which may lead to 
potentially disastrous consequences. Some of the causes are disillusions of 
individuals, angry constituents, misleading interpretations of 
blogs/forums, posts/interviews, or mischief mongers spreading 
unsubstantiated rumors. The effects, whether the allegations are true or 
unsubstantiated is irrelevant, as these allegations become damaging to the 
reputation of an organization as a whole.273 
 
 Neither “potentially disastrous consequences” nor “mischief mongers” are clearly 
defined, but both imply pejorative labels for those who critique or question the mission of 
the WKU CI. Immediately following this quotation, the report acknowledges that 
misperceptions may exist among faculty and staff. 
One of the main issues that exist with faculty and staff is the lack of 
education and explanation of what a Confucius Institute is, its mission, 
and purpose. As with any new program, collaborating with another 
country, all communication is directed from the top down. It is up to the 
President/Chancellor of the University to set the vision, purpose, and tone 
for the campus at-large. One of the tones that must be established is that 
the CI program is not an “Academic Unit,” and does not set curriculum, 
recruit students, or hire faculty.274 
 






 For those who may express concern over the CI muddying the view of China for 
those largely unaware about Chinese history or human rights abuses pervasive in the 
PRC, the report highlights that, “The CI program is only a feeder program into these 
Chinese/Asian studies programs on campus.”275 The report also makes clear that 
“Everyone is not going to buy into the programs’ mission, and will continue to look at the 
program as Chinese propaganda, a take-over, or soft power.”276 Because of these 
assessments of CIs, the report offers a solution: “If these issues go unaddressed by both 
the University and the CI, they will continue to fester, grow, and these thoughts and ideas 
will begin influencing more faculty/staff across campus. These issues must be addressed 
quickly and concisely.”277 While there is no mention of how to “address” these issues, the 
WKU CI emphasizes that it encourages “a spirit of openness, honesty, and transparency” 
in order for claims by critics to become “unsupported allegations, and their real motives 
will be exposed.”278  
 Finally, the report issues a warning to those who may hear negative reports about 
CIs. “Investigative reports are running loose trying to get their story of the Confucius 
Institute, thus, a lot of the Universities [sic] are receiving pressure to interview, and 
discuss with journalists about some of these negative comments or actions.”279 For any CI 
teacher that may be questioned about CIs, the report offers a warning: “[One] must be 








strategic about what is said, how it is said, and ensure that what is being presented is 
exactly what the CI wants shared.”280 
 Based on this report, it is evident that the WKU CI is identical to all other CIs that 
have been criticized by those who value academic freedom. Although the WKU CI has 
neither been removed nor made international headlines, the criticisms and concerns that 
are pervasive around the world are just as applicable in western Kentucky. By harboring 
a CI, WKU is complicit in discriminatory hiring, a direct violation of federal law, 
willingly aiding an undemocratic, authoritarian state’s public diplomacy efforts, and 
sacrificing academic freedom for funding and recognition from the Chinese state. While 
some argue that the WKU CI is not involved in curriculum or student research, these 
concerns combined with the unprecedented nature of the fifty-year agreement raises 
larger, serious questions about allowing the Chinese government to exercise soft power, 














































CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION 
 
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is one of the world’s leading human rights 
abusers. For individuals to explore, research, and analyze any topic without prohibitions 
or repercussions, academic freedom must be a human right worthy of international 
protection. As agents of the Chinese state, Confucius Institutes represent a stark departure 
from the commitment to and respect for the Anglo-American conception of academic 
freedom. The implications of promoting the public diplomacy of the PRC at universities 
and enabling PRC propaganda to infiltrate academia cannot be understated. From the 
rigid, multitiered hierarchy to violations of basic standards of academic integrity, it is 
evident that universities lose their credibility as institutions of higher learning that value 
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academic freedom by promoting the expansion and influence of CIs. Finally, a university 
that condones the presence of a CI on its campus signifies to the global community that 
the influence of — and money from — the PRC eclipse academic freedom. The examples 
used in this thesis make this abundantly clear. 
Due to its omnipresent human rights abuses, China should not be able to so easily 
sell itself to global institutions of higher learning until it commits to liberal democratic 
reforms to expand human rights. To truly defend academic freedom as a human right, 
universities must terminate their agreements with Hanban or, at the very least, implement 
the commonsense oversight provisions outlined by the AAUP. These provisions require 
the university to maintain control over all academic matters, including choices of text and 
teacher selection, require CIs to affirm the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic 
Freedom and Tenure, and demand the university-Hanban agreement to be a public 
document accessible to all members of the academic community. However, if American 
state governments do not commit to adequately funding higher education, it is likely that 
cash-strapped universities will continue to accept Chinese money, raising the question 
that the Chinese government may one day administer East Asian Studies departments in 
liberal democracies.  
Based on this research, it is evident that academic freedom is a human right worthy 
of international protection. As such, it must never be forfeited, especially when a foreign 





































 “Agreement between the Confucius Institute Headquarters of China and United States, 
Confucius Institute at Western Kentucky University on the Dedicated Site of a 
Model Confucius Institute.” Accessed March 28, 2017. 
American Association of University Professors. “1915 Declaration of Principles on 
Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure.” Accessed November 27, 2016. 
http://www.akronaaup.org/documents/AAUP1915.pdf. PDF. 
American Association of University Professors. “1940 Statement of Principles on 
Academic Freedom and Tenure.” Accessed November 27, 2016. 
https://www.aaup.org/report/1940-statement-principles-academic-freedom-and-
tenure. 




American Association of University Professors. “On Partnerships with Foreign 
Governments: The Case of Confucius Institutes.” Last modified June 2014. 
https://www.aaup.org/report/confucius-institutes. 
Chinese Testing International. “About Us.” Accessed March 28, 2017. 
http://www.chinesetest.cn/goaboutus.do. 
Churchman, Michael. China Heritage Quarterly. “Confucius Institutes and Controlling 
Chinese Languages.” Last modified June 2011. 
http://www.chinaheritagequarterly.org/articles.php?searchterm=026_confucius.in
c&issue=026. 
Confucius Institute. “CI at WKU.” Accessed March 28, 2017, http://ci-
wku.org/?page_id=74. 
Confucius Institute. “WKU CI Overview.” Accessed March 28, 2017. 
https://www.wku.edu/ci/wkucioverview.mp4. 
Falun Dafa. “Brief Introduction to Falun Dafa.” Accessed November 27, 2016. 
http://en.falundafa.org. 
Free Tibet. “Is Tibet a Country?” Accessed November 27, 2016. 
https://freetibet.org/about/legal-status-tibet. 
Freedom House. “China.” Accessed November 27, 2016. 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2016/china. 
Freedom House. “Our Work.” Accessed November 27, 2016. 
https://freedomhouse.org/our-work. 
Greatrex, Roger. European Association for Chinese Studies. “Letter of Protest at 
Interference in EACS Conference in Portugal, July 2014.” Last modified July 
2014. http://chinesestudies.eu/?p=585. 
Hanban. “About Confucius Institutes.” Accessed November 27, 2016. 
http://english.hanban.org/node_10971.htm. 




Hanban. “Confucius Institute Headquarters.” Accessed November 27, 2016. 
http://english.hanban.org/node_7716.htm. 
Hanban. “Curriculum Vitae of Xu Lin,” Accessed November 27, 2016. 
http://english.hanban.org/article/2012-08/30/content_518325.htm. 
Hanban. "Overseas Volunteer Chinese Teacher Program.” Accessed November 27, 2016. 
http://english.hanban.org/volunteers/node_9806.htm#no1. 
Hanban News. “Confucius Institute at West Kentucky University.” Last modified 
November 30, 2010. http://english.hanban.org/article/2010-
11/30/content_202483.htm. 
Human Rights Watch. “China: Events of 2015.” Accessed November 27, 2016. 
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/china-and-tibet. 
Keyishian v. Board of Regents. 385 U.S. 589 (1967). 
Kleindienst v. Mandel. 408 U.S. 753 (1972). 
Martin Luther King Jr. The Atlantic. “Letter From Birmingham Jail.” Last modified April 
16, 2013. http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/04/martin-luther-
kings-letter-from-birmingham-jail/274668/. 
The National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China. “Constitution.” Last 
modified March 14, 2004. http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/2007-
11/15/content_1372964.htm. 
Students for a Free Tibet. “Who We Are.” Accessed November 27, 2016. 
https://www.studentsforafreetibet.org/who-we-are/. 
Student for a Free Tibet. “Protect Academic Freedom: Say No To Confucius Institutes.” 
Accessed November 27, 2016. 
https://www.studentsforafreetibet.org/campaigns/protect-academic-freedom-say-
no-to-confucius-institutes/. 
Sweezy v. New Hampshire. 354 U.S. 234 (1957). 
United Nations. "International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.” Last modified 





United Nations. "International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.” Last 
modified December 16, 1966. 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CESCR.aspx. 
United Nations. “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” Accessed November 27, 
2016. http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/. 
United Nations Economic and Social Council. “Right to Education: Scope and 
Implementation.” Accessed November 27, 2016. 
http://www.unescobkk.org/fileadmin/user_upload/appeal/human_rights/Article_1
3_Right_to_Edu_Scope_and_Implementation.pdf. PDF. 
United States Government Accountability Office. “U.S. Universities in China Emphasize 
Academic Freedom but Face Internet Censorship and Other Challenges.” Last 
modified August 2016. http://gao.gov/assets/680/679322.pdf. PDF. 
Western Kentucky University. “About WKU.” Accessed March 28, 2017. 
http://www.wku.edu/about/. 
Western Kentucky University. “Senate Executive Committee Motion August 17, 2015.” 
Last modified August 17, 2015. 
http://www.wku.edu/senate/archives/archives_2015/f-2-senate-executive-
committee-motion-august-17.pdf. PDF. 
Western Kentucky University. “Student Government Association Legislation Archive.” 
Last modified September 22, 2015. 
http://www.wku.edu/sga/accountability/cires.docx. 
Western Kentucky University. University Senate Meeting Minutes November 19, 2015. 
Accessed March 30, 2017. 
https://www.wku.edu/senate/archives/archives_2015/a-1-nov-19-2015-university-
senate-meeting-minutes.pdf. PDF. 
Western Kentucky University. “Board of Regents Meeting Archives January 23, 2015.” 
Accessed March 30, 2017. 
https://www.wku.edu/regents/documents/2015/01_23_2015-bor-agenda-and-
min.pdf. PDF. 




World Health Organization. "International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights.” Accessed November 27, 2016. 
http://www.who.int/hhr/Economic_social_cultural.pdf. PDF. 
Xiaohua, Peng. European Association for Chinese Studies. “Hanban, you’ve mis-




BBC News. “The Tibet issue.” Last modified May 21, 2008. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7410745.stm. 
Bradshaw, James and Colin Freeze. The Globe and Mail. “McMaster closing Confucius 
Institute over hiring issues.” Last modified February 7, 2013. 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/education/mcmaster-closing-
confucius-institute-over-hiring-issues/article8372894/. 
College Heights Herald. “SGA tables resolution that asks Ransdell to revisit $1.5 million 
Hanban contract.” Last modified September 14, 2015. 
http://wkuherald.com/opinion/sga-tables-resolution-that-asks-ransdell-to-revisit-
million-hanban/article_ed9c209a-5b32-11e5-abb1-93ec538c0101.html. 
Cook, Sarah and Leeshai Lemish. The Jamestown Foundation. “The 610 Office: Policing 
the Chinese Spirit.” Last modified September 16, 2011. 
https://jamestown.org/program/the-610-office-policing-the-chinese-spirit/. 
Corum, John. College Heights Herald. “New Chinese building leads to questions.” Last 
modified February 23, 2015. http://wkuherald.com/life/new-chinese-building-
leads-to-questions/article_51a5f41e-bbc2-11e4-b5e0-bf68848e632a.html. 
domain-b.com. “No Chinese in India, says government.” Last modified October 8, 2009. 
http://www.domain-b.com/economy/general/20091008_pratibha_patil.html. 




The Economist. “China is spending billions to make the world love it.” Last modified 
March 23, 2017. http://www.economist.com/news/china/21719508-can-money-
buy-sort-thing-china-spending-billions-make-world-love-it. 
Goldberg, Michelle. The Nation. “This Is What Happens When You Slash Funding for 
Public Universities.” Last modified May 19, 2015. 
https://www.thenation.com/article/gentrification-higher-ed/. 
Gonzalez, Mike. The Heritage Foundation. “China’s Public Opinion Warfare: How Our 
Culture Industry Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the PRC.” Last modified 
February 5, 2015. http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/02/chinas-
public-opinion-warfare-how-our-culture-industry-learned-to-stop-worrying-and-
love-the-prc. 
Guttenplan, D.D. The New York Times. “Critics Worry About Influence of Chinese 
Institutes on U.S. Campuses.” Last modified March 4, 2012. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/05/us/critics-worry-about-influence-of-chinese-
institutes-on-us-campuses.html. 
Hartig, Falk. Chinese public diplomacy: the rise of the Confucius Institute. London: 
Routledge, 2016. 
Henderson, Andrew. College Heights Herald. “Confusion over Confucius training results 
in possible intellectual property theft.” Last modified May 5, 2016. 
http://wkuherald.com/news/confusion-over-confucius-training-results-in-possible-
intellectual-property-theft/article_1591ef94-1253-11e6-9e40-3382baa2eb50.html. 
Hunt, Lynn. Inventing Human Rights: A History. New York: Norton, 2007. 
Marcus, Jon. Times Higher Education. “West’s universities reconsider China-funded 
Confucius Institutes.” Last modified April 4, 2013. 
https://www.timeshighereducation.com/news/wests-universities-reconsider-china-
funded-confucius-institutes/2002870.article. 
Matas, David. End Organ Pillaging. “David Matas Combatting in Utah.” Last modified 
September 19, 2014. http://endorganpillaging.org/david-matas-in-utah/. 
McCord, Edward A. The Diplomat. “Confucius Institutes: Hardly a Threat to Academic 





Mosher, Stephen W. Population Research Institute. “Confucius Institutes: Trojan Horses 
with Chinese Characteristics.” Last modified March 28, 2012. 
https://www.pop.org/content/confucius-institutes-trojan-horses-chinese-
characteristics. 
Moyn, Samuel. The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History. Cambridge, MA: Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2012. 
Mudd, Aaron. Bowling Green Daily News. “WKU president sees Confucius Institute as 




Nakagawa, Ulara. The Diplomat. “Confucius Controversy.” Last modified March 7, 
2011. http://thediplomat.com/2011/03/confucius-controversy/. 
Nye, Joseph. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public 
Affairs, 2004. 
Peterson, Rachelle. National Association of Scholars. “Outsourced To China: Confucius 




Rajagopal, Balakrishnan. Academic Freedom as a Human Right: An Internationalist 
Perspective. Last modified June 2003, 
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/47917/Academic_Freedom_Human_Rights.pdf. 
PDF. 
Redden, Elizabeth. Inside Higher Ed. “Chicago to Close Confucius Institute.” Last 
modified September 26, 2014. 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/09/26/chicago-severs-ties-chinese-
government-funded-confucius-institute. 
Redden, Elizabeth. Inside Higher Ed. “New Scrutiny for Confucius Institutes.” Last 





Sahlins, Marshall. Confucius Institutes: Academic Malware. Chicago: Prickly Paradigm 
Press, 2015. 
Sahlins, Marshall. The Nation. “China U.” Last modified October 30, 2013. 
https://www.thenation.com/article/china-u/. 
Sudworth, John. BBC News. “Confucius institute: The hard side of China's soft power.” 
Last modified December 22, 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-
30567743. 
UChicago News. “Statement on the Confucius Institute at the University of Chicago.” 
Last modified September 25, 2014. 
https://news.uchicago.edu/article/2014/09/25/statement-confucius-institute-
university-chicago. 
University of Chicago Law School. “The Socratic Method.” Accessed November 27, 
2016. http://www.law.uchicago.edu/prospectives/lifeofthemind/socraticmethod. 
The Wall Street Journal. “Beijing’s Propaganda Lessons.” Last modified August 7, 2014. 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/beijings-propaganda-lessons-1407430440. 
